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Abstract 
The “less-developed” interior of early modern Europe, especially the rural economy, 
is often regarded as financially comatose. This paper investigates this view using a 
rich dataset of marriage and death inventories for seventeenth-century Germany. It 
first analyzes how borrowing varied with gender, age, marital status, occupation, life-
cycle juncture, date, and asset portfolios. It then explores the characteristics of debts, 
examining borrowing purposes, familial links, intracommunal ties, and documentary 
instruments. It finds that ordinary people, even in a “less-developed” economy in rural 
central Europe, sought to invest profitably, smooth consumption, bridge low liquidity, 
and hold savings in financial form. 
 
JEL Classifications: N23, G11, O12, D14 
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1. Introduction 
 
Early modern rural financial activity, long emphasized for the Low Countries, England 
and France, remains largely unexplored for German-speaking central Europe.1 
Traditional German historiography often portrays borrowing as being precluded by non-
capitalist mentalities among peasants before the nineteenth century.2 Many scholars 
accept Chayanov’s view that in peasant societies “capital” and “interest” are not 
comprehensible concepts and “cannot even be defined quantitatively”.3 Other studies 
view rural borrowing as a profoundly negative economic indicator, signalling 
pauperization,4 social polarization,5 and “forced commercialization”.6 According to this 
view, borrowing only arose when the rural poor, struggling to make ends meet, were 
forced to pledge (and often lose) their landholdings to predatory lenders, especially 
Jews.7 Pre-industrial German elites had adopted a similar stance, arguing that rural 
people should be prevented from borrowing, be required to obtain permission before 
doing so, be forbidden to pay high interest rates, or be prohibited from using 
sophisticated financial instruments, in the interests of protecting them from their own 
irrationality and ensuring they would owe money only to landlords (for rents) and rulers 
(for taxes) and not to creditors (for their own borrowing).8 German financial history 
                                                 
1 As emphasized in Wunder (1987), 24; Pfister (2007), 490; Häberlein (2007), 37-8. 
2 See Sczesny (2002), 325. 
3 Chayanov (1986), 5; Brunner (1986), 107; Kriedte/Medick/Schlumbohm (1981), 53; Figes (1989), 12; 
Pallot (1999), 14-16. 
4 See Boelcke (1964), 324-35; Blömer (1990), 2-43; Boelcke (1991), 195, 198, 200, 202, 207-11; 
Blessing (1997), 879. 
5 Sabean (1990), 19-20, 47-8, 194; Sabean (1998), 298. 
6 Kriedte/Medick/Schlumbohm (1981), 47-50, 102-07. 
7 For a discussion of these issues, see Gilomen (1998), 112-13; Guinnane (2001), 374; Binnenkade 
(2007), 154, 166-7; Fertig (2008), 161-2; Clemens/Reupke (2008), 237. 
8 Boelcke (1964), 324-35; Wunder (1987), 42; Blömer (1990), 2-43; Boelcke (1991), 195, 198, 200, 202, 
207-11; Blessing (1997), 879; Gilomen (1998), 99-101, 112-13, 128-31; Binnenkade (2007), 154; Laufer 
(2007), 115-16; Schofield/Lambrecht (2009), 8. 
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long concentrated primarily on merchants, cities, and banks,9 and although rural 
borrowing is recently attracting more attention, most research still focuses on the 
nineteenth century.10 
 This paper will argue that analysing rural credit is central to understanding 
economic performance in the “less developed” interior of central Europe in a period – 
the seventeenth century – in which the economies of the north Atlantic seaboard were 
undergoing rapid growth and development. As the modern micro-credit literature 
emphasizes, borrowing enables people to improve payment services, smooth 
consumption over time, finance profitable investments that they cannot fund from their 
current resources, and diversify risks.11 Rural credit markets are particularly important 
for enhancing human well-being and productive capacity in a developing economy 
because they serve its largest sector and its poorest social groups.12 Our lack of 
knowledge about rural credit outside the early modern success-stories – England, 
France, Flanders, Holland – may therefore hamper our understanding of pre-industrial 
economic development across the European continent more widely. 
 We seek to fill this gap by reconstructing the whole world of borrowing for 
ordinary people in a rural region of seventeenth-century Germany, using a rich dataset 
of marriage and death inventories which we have linked with other documentary 
sources on the same population. We first focus on economic agents – not just debtors 
but also those who did not borrow at all. We explore how borrowing (or its absence) 
varied with personal characteristics such as gender, age, and marital status, with 
economic characteristics such as occupation and wealth, and with the composition of 
                                                 
9 As remarked in Gilomen (1998), 101-03; Häberlein (2007), 37-8, 46; Laufer (2007), 99; Fertig (2008), 
162; Clemens/Reupke (2008), 211; Fertig (2009), 169. 
10 For an outstanding exception, see Sczesny (2002), 295-327. On the nineteenth century there are 
excellent studies by, among others, Guinnane (2001); Laufer (2007); Fertig (2008); Fertig (2009); 
Clemens/Reupke (2008); and Mauch (2009). 
11 World Bank (1989). 
12 Basu (1997), 267-80; Ray (1998), 529-84. 
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asset portfolios. We investigate the life-cycle of borrowing for these early modern 
people, and consider the reasons for the age-profile of borrowing we discover. We 
examine whether “over-indebtedness” was a widespread problem, how private 
borrowing responded to periods of warfare and crisis, and whether structural changes 
such as proto-industrialization were associated with “debt peonage”. We then turn our 
attention to the debts themselves, examining the heterogeneous sources of credit 
available in this rural economy and asking whether people borrowed for consumption or 
production purposes, whether agriculture or industry benefited more, whether 
borrowing extended beyond the immediate family and community, whether 
impersonality increased over time, and how debts were intermediated and documented. 
We conclude by drawing the implications of this micro-level exploration of rural 
borrowing in central Europe for open questions about pre-industrial European economic 
development. 
 
2. The Micro-Study 
 
Early modern credit markets can be analysed using a whole array of sources – court 
records,13 notarial registers,14 pledge-books,15 mortgage-books,16 aldermen’s registers,17 
contract-registers,18 land registers,19 farm account-books,20 tax lists,21 annuity 
registers,22 and bank records23 – each of which sheds light on a different subset of debt. 
                                                 
13 Muldrew (1998); Binnenkade (2007); Laufer (2007); Schuster (2008), 39-41. 
14 Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2000); Potter/Rosenthal (2002); Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal 
(2004); Clemens/Reupke (2008). 
15 Lorenzen-Schmidt (2006), 9; Mauch (2009). 
16 Lorenzen-Schmidt (2006), 9; Laufer (2007); Fertig (2009). 
17 Limberger (2009), 64-5; Thoen/Soens (2009), 21-2. 
18 Winnige (2004), 74-5; Laufer (2007); Schuster (2008), 42-3. 
19 Laufer (2007); Bracht/Fertig (2008). 
20 Lorenzen-Schmidt (2006), 10-12. 
21 Ineichen (1992), 70; Sczesny (2002), 298-305. 
22 Lambrecht (2009). 
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But to assess the overall importance of borrowing for individuals and households, we 
ideally need a source recording the entire range of types of borrowing in which they 
engaged. This paper uses such a source: detailed personal inventories drawn up at 
marriage, remarriage, widowhood, and death in a German rural community during the 
seventeenth century. 
 
2.1. Early Modern Wildberg 
 
The community of Wildberg lies in the forested valley of the Nagold River in the 
southwest German territory of Württemberg. Although legally a town, Wildberg was a 
small, rural settlement whose inhabitants relied on farming alongside manufacturing and 
services.24 Table 1 shows the development of the total population, number of taxpayers, 
and land-owning population in Wildberg from the sixteenth through to the nineteenth 
century. With fewer than 1,000 inhabitants in 1600, the population of the locality 
expanded to around 1,650 up to the Imperial invasion of 1634. From then to the end of 
the Thirty Years War in 1648, its population hovered around 1,000 inhabitants, and 
although it gradually recovered to about 1,400 inhabitants by the mid-1670s, renewed 
war with France in the 1680s and 1690s reduced its size to some 1,200 inhabitants in 
1700.25 
 The rapid expansion of proto-industrial worsted production after about 1580 saw 
weaving become a livelihood source for about 40 percent of Wildberg households by 
the mid-seventeenth century and spinning a mainstay of its female inhabitants.26 In a 
parallel development, as Table 1 shows, the percentage of Wildberg taxpayers owning 
                                                                                                                                               
23 Bracht/Fertig (2008). 
24 Ogilvie (1997); Ogilvie (2003); Mantel (1974). 
25 Ogilvie/Küpker/Maegraith (2009a), 8-10 (Tables 1-2). 
26 Ogilvie (1997), chapters 6, 8. 
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land (other than cottage gardens) declined from around 70 percent in 1565 to around 50 
percent in 1614 and 1629, but the proportion then recovered to around 60 percent for the 
rest of the century. Wildberg thus remained a small, agricultural community throughout 
this period, although most households combined small-scale farming with other 
occupations.27 
Most secondary- and tertiary-sector occupations in Württemberg, including the 
weaving, dyeing and exporting of proto-industrial worsteds, were controlled by 
“regional” (rural-urban) guilds, which until the nineteenth century maintained entry 
barriers, fixed wages and prices, and excluded women, migrants, Jews, labourers, and 
many others.28 The courts, councils, assemblies and officials of Württemberg’s 
powerful local communities closely monitored and administered settlement, marriage, 
migration, inheritance, consumption, prices, wages, land transactions – and financial 
dealings. The Württemberg state also regulated factor and product markets in symbiosis 
with the local communities and the occupational corporations.29  
 
2.2. Württemberg Inventories 
 
Württemberg had a partible inheritance system in which spouses retained rights over 
property brought into marriage, and daughters inherited equally with sons. To facilitate 
administration of this system, from 1551 onwards the Württemberg state mandated 
death inventories – “contingent inheritance inventories” (Eventualteilungen), drawn up 
for a couple when one spouse died, at which inheritance shares were recorded but not 
actually allocated among heirs; and “actual inheritance inventories” (Realteilungen), 
drawn up for widowed (and a few never-married) persons, at which inheritance shares 
                                                 
27 Ogilvie (1997), ch. 2; Ogilvie (2003), ch. 2; Ogilvie/Küpker/Maegraith (2009a). 
28 Ogilvie (1997), ch. 3; Ogilvie (2004). 
29 Sabean (1990); Maisch (1992); Medick (1996); Ogilvie (1997); Ogilvie (1999); Ogilvie (2003). 
 6
were actually distributed. From 1610 onwards the state also mandated inventories at 
marriage and remarriage (Beibringungsinventare). Inventories were sometimes also 
“decreed” to address special circumstances such as marital conflict, desertion, crime, or 
indebtedness.30 
 Württemberg inventories were carefully structured documents. An introductory 
section recorded locality, date, and personal details – not just for inventoried individuals 
but for their offspring and other heirs, and often also for parents and former spouses. A 
second section listed real estate, including buildings, gardens, arable fields, pastures, 
woods, and fishing-waters. A third section recorded all moveable goods, including those 
worth only one Heller (the smallest currency unit), in pre-specified categories: cash, 
ornaments and jewellery, silver valuables, men’s clothing, women’s clothing, books, 
bedding, household linen, household vessels (in sub-categories), furniture, general 
household goods, farm and craft tools, animals, food and grain stores, business wares, 
and miscellaneous items.31 A fourth section recorded outgoing debts (Passiva) and 
financial assets (Aktiva). The final section struck a balance, divided any inheritance 
among heirs, and recorded participants’ signatures.  
 This paper focuses on the outgoing debts recorded in all surviving Wildberg 
inventories for the period 1602-1700. This approach is made possible by the fact that 
Württemberg inventories were supposed to record monetary values for all items listed 
although, as we shall see, not all of the earliest surviving inventories did so. Counter to 
occasional claims in the historiography that inventory valuations were merely 
standardized assessments, there are strong reasons to believe that Württemberg 
inventories recorded actual prices. First, inventory-makers were not casual amateurs 
drawing up an occasional inventory, but specially appointed community officials 
                                                 
30 Mannheims (1991); Bidlingmaier (2005). 
31 Mannheims (1991), 61. 
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(Inventierer) assisted by professional clerks, an important part of whose training 
consisted in learning how to draw up inventories carefully so as to avoid inheritance 
conflicts. Inventory-makers even sometimes asked women to assist them in describing 
and valuing gender-specific items.32 Second, certain items in the inventories themselves 
were explicitly described as having been paid for by the bride or groom personally. 
Third, prices for the same item type in the same inventory varied with quality.33 Fourth, 
creditors were sometimes repaid by being given moveable goods from the inventory, 
which they would hardly have accepted had the valuations deviated from the market 
price. Finally, inheritance shares were legally allocated according to inventory 
valuations, a practice to which neither heirs nor courts would have consented had the 
valuations not been accurate. Prices of all items in an inventory would have had to be 
“wrong” to precisely the same degree in order to satisfy sharp-eyed heirs and creditors. 
It was surely easier for inventory-makers simply to use the prices paid for these items 
on the market, which the evidence suggests they did.34 Certainly, the very precise values 
recorded for outgoing debts in Wildberg inventories provide strong reason for placing 
reliance upon these data as an accurate record of the borrowing activity of the individual 
or couple concerned.  
 
2.3. The Socio-Economic Coverage of Württemberg Inventories 
 
According to Württemberg law, a person or couple was not legally obliged to be 
inventoried if they possessed a special legal status, left a will, agreed to marital 
community of property, got the district court’s approval, drew up a private inventory, 
had only one heir, or obtained agreement from all their heirs – although such people 
                                                 
32 Mannheims (1991), 44-54, 61 with n. 27. 
33 Boelcke (1964), 322 n. 8. 
34 For similar conclusions reached for English inventories, see Overton (2000), 127. 
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could be inventoried, since these rules were just treated as guidelines. Administrative 
breakdown, corruption, and bureaucratic negligence could also prevent inventorying.35  
The administrative guidelines about inventorying imply that Württemberg 
inventories may have systematically excluded certain groups. It is therefore important to 
consider for Württemberg the various types of bias for which inventory studies are often 
criticized. 
One source of bias relates to gender. Historical inventories tend to survive for 
many more men than women, as shown by the preponderance of males in historical 
inventory studies for early modern England.36 Württemberg inventories, by contrast, 
survive for more women than men, one result of the strictly partible inheritance system 
that caused these inventories to be mandated. As Table 2 shows, of the 1,292 surviving 
inventories of individuals at marriage for seventeenth-century Wildberg, over 50 
percent were for brides. Females dominated males to an even greater extent among the 
144 surviving inventories of individuals at death, in which over 64 percent were for 
females, as can be seen from Table 3. 
A second source of bias for which historical inventory studies are criticized is 
age. This arises primarily from the fact that in most historical societies, inventories were 
drawn up at death but not at marriage. Historians have traditionally assumed that the age 
distribution of inventoried persons was biased toward older age-groups because death 
was more likely at that age. However, for early modern England, Overton and his co-
authors have argued that the age distribution of inventoried persons closely resembled 
that for the country as a whole, although their argument is heavily based on findings for 
a single Kentish village between 1580 and 1711.37 For nineteenth-century Sweden, by 
                                                 
35 Mannheims (1991), 28-9.  
36 Overton et al. (2004), 27-8, 208; Sneath (2009), 104-05. 
37 Sneath (2009), 39-40. 
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contrast, Lindgren finds that, as expected, the frequency of death inventories was higher 
for older age-groups.38 
An advantage of Württemberg inventories is that they were legally compulsory 
at four life-cycle junctures – marriage, remarriage, widowhood, and death. As Table 9 
shows, and as discussed below in greater detail, this meant that inventories survive for 
adults of all ages between 17 and 87 years. There is unquestionably some heaping of 
marriage inventories in the prime ages of first marriage (the mid-twenties) but people 
remarried throughout their middle years and old age, and inventories were drawn up on 
those occasions. Death inventories, moreover, were scattered across the whole age-
spectrum from 23 to 87. As a result of being in a position to link the Wildberg 
inventories to a family reconstitution based on parish registers, as well as to a series of 
censuses recording ages, we were able to reconstruct the ages of a majority of 
inventoried individuals. Consequently, in the multivariate regressions in Section 5 
below, we control for any age bias that might exist in our sample by including ages of 
both inventoried persons and their spouses as explanatory variables.  
Those whom demographic accident had deprived of heirs may also be under-
represented in Württemberg inventories, given the legal exemption from compulsory 
inventorying for those with one heir or none. On the other hand, such persons were not 
wholly unrepresented in the inventories for seventeenth-century Wildberg. Thus the 304 
inventories for Wildberg couples at death between 1602 and 1700 include 34 in which 
there is only a single heir and one in which there is no heir at all, and thus more than 11 
percent of the surviving death inventories for Wildberg couples in this period had been 
drawn up despite the fact that there was no legal obligation to do so. 
                                                 
38 Lindgren (2002), 821-2. 
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It is also conceivable that heirs could be somehow coerced into agreeing to do 
without an inventory, but there is no evidence of this having taken place. On the 
contrary, heirs had strong incentives to comply with the legal obligation that an estate 
be inventoried, since only that could ensure a fair division, defend their interests against 
those of the surviving spouse who would have inside information about the size and 
composition of the estate, and ensure that they were formally exempted from 
garnishment should undisclosed loans of the deceased person later come to light.39  
Probably the largest demographic sub-group under-represented in Württemberg 
inventories were those who remained unmarried throughout their lives. This was an 
inevitable consequence of the process that generated inventories in Württemberg: never-
married persons could by definition not be inventoried at marriage or remarriage, and 
their relative economic deprivation (which was in most cases both a cause and a 
consequence of their never-married status) meant that they were much less likely than 
married or widowed individuals to be inventoried at death.40 In seventeenth-century 
Wildberg, 7.8 percent of women and 1.5 percent of men dying over the age of 49 were 
single, to which must be added some proportion of the 0.7 percent of women and 5.6 
percent of men dying over the age of 49 who were of unknown marital status at death.41 
Although never-married persons could not be represented among the marriage 
inventories, they could be inventoried at death, and the inventories for seventeenth-
century Wildberg do include death inventories for two never-married males and four 
never-married females. Never-married adults are thus not wholly excluded from 
observation. Furthermore, it must be recognized that the marriage inventories for 
                                                 
39 Lindgren (2002), 818-19, discusses these forces at work in the coverage of inventories in eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century Sweden. 
40 On the relative economic deprivation of never-married individuals in early modern Württemberg, and a 
discussion of the economic and institutional pressures underlying this deprivation, see Ogilvie (2003), 
chapters 4 and 6. 
41 Ogilvie (2003), 44-7 with Tables 2.1 and 2.2 
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individuals entering into their first marriages represent persons who had, until that 
marriage, never been married, and thus these inventories cast light on the possessions 
(and debts) of this demographic sub-group. 
A further common source of bias in historical inventory studies is that 
inventories are likely to under-represent certain socio-economic strata. In most cases, it 
is assumed that inventories provide little or no coverage of less-well-off social strata. In 
Württemberg, the situation was more complicated because the inventorying regulations 
actually exempted certain high-status groups. Thus one of the exemptions from the legal 
obligation to be inventoried was enjoyed by those with “special legal status”, who 
comprised members of the royal family, state bureaucrats and their families, clergymen, 
and other high-status groups enjoying specific jurisdictional privileges.42 The exemption 
of such individuals from the legal obligation to be inventoried meant that certain groups 
at the top end of the social spectrum were probably under-represented. However, these 
high-status groups were not totally excluded. The Wildberg inventories for the 
seventeenth century include at least one for a Vogt (the top state bureaucrat in the 
district administration),43 one for a widow of a Stadtschreiber (a senior state bureaucrat 
in the district administration whose family would have been legally exempt from the 
obligation to be inventoried),44 one for a clergyman,45 and three for clergymen’s 
widows.46 As these cases make clear, those groups that were exempted from the legal 
obligation to be inventoried did sometimes have inventories drawn up anyway, and are 
thus to some extent represented in our sample. Persons rich enough to afford the costs of 
drawing up a will might also have been under-represented – although again not totally 
                                                 
42 Mannheims (1991), 28-9. 
43 HStAS A573 Bd. 4890, 17.05.1641. 
44 HStAS A573 Bd. 4885 (1636 No. 7), 4978 (1733 No. 14). 
45 HStAS A573 Bd. 4804 (19.07.1625). 
46 HStAS A573 Bd4806 (1649 No. 4), 4932 (1685 No. 14), 4946 (1699 No. 7). 
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excluded, since 23 of the surviving inventories for seventeenth-century Wildberg 
mention the existence of a will or attach a copy of it to the inventory.  
Württemberg must also have been somewhat affected by the pressures causing 
inventories in most pre-modern European societies to under-represent lower-status 
groups, especially those with little property to leave to any heirs.47 If an individual or 
couple had no property other than the clothes they stood up in, they were obviously less 
likely to be inventoried unless there was some dispute over the question of whether they 
were truly destitute. Moreover, the inventory-makers and the town or village clerk 
charged a fee for carrying out the inventorying, which a very poor person would have 
found it more difficult to pay, thereby creating an incentive for such propertiless 
individuals to avoid being inventoried and for busy officials to avoid inventorying them. 
On the other hand, in Württemberg law there was no minimum wealth level 
below which one was exempted from the obligation to be inventoried, unlike in England 
where a probate inventory was not required if the deceased person left wealth worth less 
than £5 (excluding real estate, which English inventories did not record).48 In the 
seventeenth century, £5 was equal to 34 Gulden in the currency of the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation, although this must be regarded as a very rough 
approximation, given lack of information on purchasing power parity between England 
and Württemberg.49 But it provides a rough dividing-line for investigating whether 
inventories in seventeenth-century Wildberg also included people with low levels of 
total wealth. The Wildberg inventories do cover people who would not have been 
inventoried in England: 23.8 percent of individuals and 2.1 percent of couples 
                                                 
47 On this problem in early modern English inventory studies, see Overton et al. (2004), 29-30, 79, 188-9; 
Sneath (2009), ch. 7; Weatherill (1996), 3, 46, 172; Cressy (1980), 42, 139, 226-7. 
48 Erickson (1993), 33; Overton (1980), 209; Moore (1985), 18.  
49 For the exchange rate between English pounds sterling and the Gulden (fl) used in German-speaking 
central Europe (albeit with somewhat varying values in different territories of the Empire), see 
http://www.pierre-marteau.com/currency/converter/rei-eng.html; in the seventeenth century, the exchange 
rate was approximately 6.67 fl = £1. 
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inventoried at marriage lay below the 34 fl threshold, as did 8.3 percent of individuals 
and 3.7 percent of couples inventoried at death.50 People at the bottom of the wealth 
distribution were not altogether missing from Württemberg inventories, therefore, 
although they were almost certainly under-represented, if only because they had few 
possessions worth recording. 
Socio-economic coverage of Württemberg inventories was thus affected at the 
top of the spectrum by the legal exemption of high-status groups and those rich enough 
to pay for wills on the one hand and at the bottom by the weaker economic incentive for 
people with few possessions to be inventoried. Taken together, these factors are likely 
to have meant that the very top and the very bottom of the socio-economic spectrum 
was under-represented in the inventoried population. However, as we have seen, neither 
end of the socio-economic spectrum was missing altogether. 
In considering the general question of the extent to which Württemberg 
inventories represented the underlying population, one further factor must be taken into 
account. Early modern Württemberg was a highly regulated state with numerous 
communal officials and paid state bureaucrats on the local level, giving rise to a 
relatively well-functioning local administration.51 The fact that the legal obligation to be 
inventoried was devolved by the central state to communal officials made it much more 
probable that it would be implemented. For one thing, communal officials were aware 
of the marriages, deaths, and inheritance situations of their fellow-citizens and thus 
knew when an event had taken place that triggered the legal obligation to be 
inventoried. For another, the fact that the inventory-makers and the town or village clerk 
                                                 
50 Calculations include only those inventories for Wildberg between 1602 and 1700 in which monetary 
values are recorded for all items. For comparability with English inventories, total wealth in these 
calculations is taken to exclude real estate (since this was not recorded in English inventories) and thus to 
consist of all moveable goods and financial assets (i.e. debts payable to the inventoried person). 
51 On this communal and state administrative structure, see Ogilvie (1997), 42-72, 79-85; Ogilvie (1999). 
For similar arguments for early modern Sweden, see Lindgren (2002), 818. 
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were entitled to be paid a fee for drawing up each inventory created an incentive for 
them to insist that the legal obligation to be inventoried be complied with so that they 
would receive their perquisites.52 
As in any document-based historical analysis, therefore, the administrative 
guidelines governing the writing of inventories in Württemberg probably did influence 
the composition of the sample of inventoried individuals and couples.53 However, the 
degree of this distortion was limited by the fact that social coverage was extremely high. 
This emerges from micro-analyses in which those who were inventoried can be 
compared with the wider population of local inhabitants. 
For the Württemberg village of Laichingen between 1766 and 1799, for 
instance, Medick found marriage inventories for over 94 percent of fully reconstituted 
families (and over 85 percent of partially reconstituted ones) in his family 
reconstitution. He found inventories at the death of the first spouse for c. 87 percent of 
couples in the reconstitution; and he found death inventories for c. 31 percent of 
widowers and c. 57 percent of widows in the reconstitution.54 
 A similarly high coverage emerges from our own investigation of the 
representativeness of the inventories in seventeenth-century Wildberg. Our family 
reconstitution is not as complete for the seventeenth century as would ideally be 
desirable because the first Wildberg baptism register was destroyed by Swedish soldiers 
in 1645, and thus information on baptisms survives only from 1646 onwards. However, 
Wildberg possesses a series of 12 tax registers and tax lists covering the period 1599-
1705.55 We explored the representativeness of the Wildberg marriage and death 
inventories for 1602-1700 by linking them with these tax registers, which recorded all 
                                                 
52 According to Lindgren (2002), 816-17, a similar incentive existed in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Sweden. 
53 See the discussion in Lindgren (2002), 816-20. 
54 Medick (1996), 614-615.  
55 HStAS A573 Bü. 1055-1145 (Steuerregister); HStAS A573 Bü. 5415 (Vermögensverzeichnisse). 
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autonomous economic units – i.e. those pursuing independent livelihoods – including 
women, solitaries, and persons with zero taxable assets (i.e. no real estate, and in many 
cases no craft or business since many tax registers also recorded those as taxable 
assets).56 
As Figure 1 shows, even though the Wildberg death inventories survive only 
from 1602 and marriage inventories in Württemberg more widely (and thus also in 
Wildberg) start only in 1610, as early as 1614 over one-third of Wildberg’s male 
taxpayers could be linked definitively with at least one inventory, rising over 40 percent 
by 1629, over 50 percent by 1639, over 67 percent by 1661, and over 80 percent by 
1695. Even among female taxpayers, 23 percent could be linked with at least one 
inventory by 1614, rising to 44 percent by 1629, and over 75 percent by 1695. Although 
the taxable wealth of the inventoried taxpayers in Wildberg was on average higher than 
that of the non-inventoried ones, the difference was not always statistically significant, 
and there were individuals with zero taxable wealth among the inventoried taxpayers in 
every cross-section. 
The socio-economic coverage provided by Württemberg inventories is high 
relative to other European inventory studies. In rural central Sweden, for instance, 
Lindgren found that for 1770 inventories survive for just 10 percent of adults who died, 
rising to 42-3 percent by 1800 and exceeding 50 percent only after about 1830.57 
Although the Württemberg inventories were neither universal nor perfectly 
representative, therefore, they covered a very substantial proportion of economic agents 
with the autonomy needed to take out loans, even among women and the propertiless, 
and in that respect surpass any other available data source on early modern rural 
portfolio composition. 
                                                 
56 This situation contrasts with early modern Dutch tax-registers, which excluded those without taxable 
assets: see McCants (2007), 3-4, 12. 
57 Lindgren (2002), 818-9. 
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3. The Institutional Framework for Borrowing in Early Modern Württemberg 
 
Borrowing and lending in any economy is inevitably influenced by the institutions of 
that society, and early modern Württemberg was no exception. The institutional 
framework of early modern Württemberg affected credit markets in four main ways: 
through providing administrative services to record and register debt agreements; 
through legal and administrative mechanisms for enforcing debt contracts; through 
requiring communal or state permission to be obtained before entering into particular 
types of debt; and through regulating the interest rates that could be legally charged for 
different types of debt or to different types of debtor. 
A first set of institutional influences on borrowing consisted in the mechanisms 
available for formally recording and registering debt contracts. Württemberg was one of 
the “non-notarial” societies of the northern part of Europe, which are generally 
contrasted with “notarial” societies such as France, Italy and other parts of 
Mediterranean Europe.58 Indeed, when foreign notaries began to operate in 
Württemberg in the 1790s the government passed legislation restricting their 
activities.59 Instead, the Württemberg government required debt documentation to be 
written up by official clerks, either the Gerichtschreiber (court clerk) of the local 
communal court or the Amtschreiber (district clerk) of the district administration, in 
accordance with a particular schedule of fees.60 In addition, all private “Passiva”, 
including but not limited to formal bonds, were supposed to be recorded in the marriage 
or death inventory of the debtor – the very documents on which we base the analysis in 
                                                 
58 Ogilvie (2011), 293-6. 
59 Reyscher (1828ff), 6:705-6, #449 (2.12.1795). 
60 Riecke (1842), 29-30, § 156-7. 
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this paper.61 In principle, recording all debts in death inventories was supposed to 
enable all creditors to be paid off before the inheritance was distributed, although in 
practice this did not happen: instead, debts were inherited along with assets.62  
A second set of institutional influences on borrowing in early modern 
Württemberg consisted in the mechanisms available for enforcing contracts between 
creditors and debtors. Legislation issued by the dukes of Württemberg as the territorial 
princes provided a thoroughgoing framework for contract enforcement within and 
between local communities, across administrative districts, and even beyond the 
national borders.63 The first judicial instance at which defaulting debtors could be 
pursued was the local communal court (Dorfgericht, Stadtgericht), at which the dense 
“social capital” of information transmission inside the closely knit Württemberg 
communities was mobilized against defaulters.64 The next level of jurisdiction was the 
district court (Amtsgericht), convened in the district capital (Amtstadt), manned by 
town council members, and chaired by the princely district governor (Amtmann). The 
district governor also pursued debtors administratively, by writing to governors of other 
districts and even beyond the frontiers of Württemberg.65 Borrowers who failed to repay 
their debts were inflicted with a variety of penalties in the communal and state courts – 
loss of collateral (where this had been provided), fining , imprisonment, garnishment of 
inheritance, confiscation of funds from personal pledges or family members, and even 
being declared “Mundtot” (deprived of the legal right to conduct one’s economic 
affairs).66 
                                                 
61 See, for instance, Reyscher (1828ff), 6:202, #222 (25.11.1698). 
62 A practice criticized but acknowledged to be common practice e.g. in Reyscher (1828ff), 6:233-4, #234 
(25.11.1709); 6:278-9, #253 (27.2.1717). 
63 Riecke (1842), 126-32, §LXXV; Reyscher (1828ff), 6:281-2, #254 (8.9.1717). 
64 Sabean (1990), e.g. 425; Ogilvie (1997), ch. 3. 
65 Reyscher (1828ff), 6:281-2, #254 (8.9.1717); Sabean (1990), 425; Ogilvie (1997), 68. 
66 For an example of a number of these penalties being imposed on a defaulting debtor from Wildberg in 
1565, see Fritz (1911), 133-4. On the threat of being declared “Mundtot” for prodigal behaviour, as laid 
out in the 1621 Württemberg national law-code, see Reyscher (1828ff), 12:742-5, #214 (11.11.1621) 
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A third set of institutional arrangements governed whether one was allowed to 
incur a formal debt. The Württemberg state required ordinary people to obtain 
communal or government permission for most formal acts of borrowing. According to 
the 1621 Landesordnung (national ordinance), no-one was to borrow money unless the 
debt was approved by his village or town council, as well as the district-level state 
bureaucrats.67 Communal officials and district bureaucrats were legally obliged to 
monitor the householding behaviour of persons who consumed or borrowed 
excessively, and to control their conduct with a variety of penalties culminating in 
declaring them “Mundtot”.68 Local studies of early modern Württemberg communities 
document how the powerful Württemberg community courts in practice exercised the 
right to veto ratification for any loan secured by real property.69  
The obligation to obtain communal or (for large loans) princely permission 
became more stringent as debts became more formal and documented, e.g. once they 
took the form of bonds or other more sophisticated debt instruments such as letters of 
exchange. Thus according to the 1536 Württemberg Landesordnung (national 
ordinance), no-one was to lend money on a bond without special princely permission, 
although if the principal did not exceed 20 fl the decision about whether to grant 
permission lay with the district bureaucrats and the local communal court; if the sum 
exceeded 20 fl, however, the borrower had to petition the prince in writing and the 
petition had to be signed by the district governor and the communal court with an 
accompanying report.70 The 1621 Landesordnung stated explicitly that no-one was to 
lend money to any Württemberg subject on a bond without the special permission of the 
                                                                                                                                               
§XLVI. For more detail on the array of different methods of ensuring repayment of debts in late medieval 
and early modern Württemberg, see Boelcke (1964). 
67 Reyscher (1828ff), 12:742-5, #214 (11.11.1621) §XIV. 
68 Reyscher (1828ff), 12:742-5, #214 (11.11.1621) §XLVI. 
69 Sabean (1990), 425; Ogilvie (1997), 68. 
70 Reyscher (1828ff), 12:116-17, #21 (1.6.1536). 
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prince, the district officials, and the community court.71 By 1781, the boundary between 
small and large loans had moved upwards but the basic requirement had not changed: 
anyone borrowing on a bond was required to get permission from his commune for 
loans up to 100 fl and from the princely government for sums above that amount.72 
According to a law of 1759, more sophisticated debt instruments, such as letters of 
exchange (Wechselbriefe), were reserved for merchants and courtiers, with ordinary 
people being required to apply for a government permit, which was costly and could be 
refused.73 The pecuniary and transaction costs of obtaining permits to borrow using 
such instruments inevitably created incentives to engage in less formal types of 
borrowing. 
The fourth main way in which Württemberg institutions influenced borrowing 
was by legislating against “usury”, which principally consisted of prohibiting lending at 
what were defined as excessively high interest rates as well as outlawing various 
lending practices in which repayment conditions were stipulated in such a way as to 
circumvent the legal interest-rate ceiling, e.g. agreements involving repaying debts in 
the form of grain, cattle, wine, or the usufruct on land.74 The result was that until the 
nineteenth century an interest-rate ceiling of 5 percent per annum applied to the vast 
majority of ordinary loans taken out by ordinary citizens in Württemberg.75 Local 
compliance was monitored by the community courts, which were required to withhold 
ratification76 and deny enforcement77 if loans involved explicit or implicit interest 
payments above 5 percent. Studies of Württemberg credit markets based on both 
                                                 
71 Reyscher (1828ff), 12:742, #214 (11.11.1621). 
72 See Reyscher (1828ff), 6:629, #422 (14.04.1781). 
73 Reyscher (1828ff), 6:534-9, #397 (24.03.1759). 
74 See, for instance, Reyscher (1828ff), 12:97-8, #21 (1.6.1536); 12:798-800, #214 (11.11.1621). 
75 Riecke (1842), 149, 169; Reyscher (1828ff), 6:177-183, #212 (5.12.1692), 12:202-05, #49 (2.1.1552); 
Wächter (1839), 495-510, 1008-1011. 
76 Sabean (1990), 425; Ogilvie (1997), 68. 
77 For an example from Wildberg in 1623, see Ogilvie (2003), 241-2. 
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inventories and mortgage books from the sixteenth through to the mid-nineteenth 
century find thoroughgoing compliance with this 5 percent ceiling.78  
This 5 percent rate ceiling clearly created excess demand for loans, as shown by 
borrowers’ eagerness to borrow at higher rates in the black market. Furthermore, rate 
ceilings (and actual interest-rates paid) were higher in early modern England,79 
Flanders,80 and the Netherlands.81 The few economic agents in early modern 
Württemberg who were legally exempted from the 5 percent ceiling were willing to pay 
12.5 percent (permitted on grain or wine loans) or even higher rates (e.g. debts incurred 
by merchants or the prince).82 Others were willing to skirt the boundaries of legality by 
taking out “usurious” loans at implicit interest rates of 25 percent (according to 
disapproving reports in 1621)83 or 15-50 percent (according to similar reports in 
1692),84 often in the form of contracts involving repayment in kind. As Lipp has pointed 
out, interest-rate ceilings in early modern Germany meant that high-risk borrowers were 
either excluded from credit altogether, or could only obtain loans in the informal sector 
at rates over the legal limit, and without the benefits of legal protection.85 
 
4. The Prevalence of Borrowing 
 
What shape did the borrowing behaviour of ordinary Württemberg inhabitants take 
within this framework? A first way in which we can use the Wildberg inventories to 
                                                 
78 Maisch (1992), 180, 202; Mauch (2009), 30-1, 91 (Anlage 2). No debt recorded in seventeenth-century 
Wildberg inventories paid above 5 percent. Cf. Lindgren (2002), 811, where in pre-1864 Sweden 
“informal” lenders were allowed to charge above the legal ceiling of 6 percent.  
79 Spufford (2000), 220-1; Sneath (2009), 154. 
80 Lambrecht (2009), 83-5.  
81 Gelderblom/Jonker (2011), 6-7, 16; Zuijderduijn (2009), 151-3; Lambrecht (2009), 83-5. 
82 Wächter (1839), 495-510, 1008-1011. 
83 Reyscher (1828ff), 12:799-800 (11.11.1621), § LVI. 
84 Reyscher (1828ff), 6:177-183, #212 (5.12.1692), § XIX, XXII. 
85 Lipp (2007), 32; see also Guinnane (2001), 368 with n. 6. 
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answer this question is to find out how prevalent borrowing actually was in this central 
European rural population.  
At marriage, as Table 2 shows, just over one-quarter of inventoried individuals 
in seventeenth-century Wildberg had debts and just under one-third had financial assets. 
A non-trivial proportion (about one-sixth) were both debtors and creditors, a pattern 
observed in other early modern economies.86 Debts were owed by Wildberg individuals 
of both sexes and all marital statuses, but were significantly more common among men 
than women and among the widowed than the unmarried.87 Asset ownership also varied 
by sex, with slightly but significantly more women holding liquid assets such as cash, 
ornaments, and animals while slightly but significantly more men held illiquid ones 
such as real estate (which was readily sold but had higher transaction costs).88 Prior 
marital status was associated with differences in assets, with significantly more 
widowed than single people of both sexes holding financial assets, silver, real estate, 
and animals at marriage, but significantly fewer holding cash.  
At death, Wildberg individuals were even more heavily involved in borrowing 
and lending than at marriage. Table 3 shows that 85-90 percent had debts, 80 percent 
had financial assets, and 70 percent had both – figures resembling those from post 
mortem inventories in other early modern European rural economies.89 In Wildberg, the 
pronounced gender differences in marriage inventories were largely lacking in death 
inventories, with no significant differences between the sexes in holdings of debts, 
financial assets, cash, silver, real estate, ornaments, or animals. We cannot make 
definitive statements about the effect of marital status on borrowing at death because 
                                                 
86 E.g. Schuster (2008), 44. 
87 Throughout this paper, “significant” means the null hypothesis is rejected at or above the 0.05 level; 
“borderline significance” means it is rejected at the 0.10 level but not the 0.05 level; “not significant” 
means the hypothesis cannot be rejected even at the 0.10 level. 
88 Sabean (1990), 355-70. 
89 E.g. Béaur (2009), 153-4; Matthews (2009), 258-9. 
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inventories were drawn up only for a handful of never-married individuals. However, all 
six never-married individuals with surviving inventories for seventeenth-century 
Wildberg had undertaken some borrowing. 
 Finally, borrowing was also widespread among Wildberg couples, as Table 4 
shows. At marriage, just under one-half of seventeenth-century Wildberg couples had 
debts, exactly half had financial assets, and about one-third had both – proportions 
similar to those found in nineteenth-century German rural economies.90 By the time one 
spouse died, over nine-tenths of couples had debts, over three-quarters had financial 
assets, and about three-quarters had both. Between marriage and death, couples’ asset 
portfolios also changed, with significantly fewer couples holding liquid assets such as 
cash and jewellery and significantly more holding illiquid ones such as real estate and 
financial claims.  
 Borrowing also extended across the economic spectrum, as Table 5 shows, with 
at least some members of every wealth stratum owing debts. However, less than 1 
percent of individuals or couples had debts exceeding total assets. Indeed, few violated 
the contemporary rule of thumb that one should not take on debts exceeding three-fifths 
of the value of the collateral one could provide91 – just 2.1 percent of individuals and 
less than 3.6 percent of couples. This is consistent with Ineichen’s finding that debt 
payments in the seventeenth-century Swiss village of Ebikon averaged only 61 percent 
of a farm’s net yield,92 and Fertig’s finding that debts in nineteenth-century Westphalian 
village inventories rarely exceeded 70 percent of the value of land and buildings.93  
 In seventeenth-century Wildberg, both the prevalence of borrowing and the 
share of assets it accounted for was significantly lower among the poor than the rich – 
                                                 
90 E.g. Laufer (2007), 105. 
91 Boelcke (1991), 212. 
92 Ineichen (1992), 76-7. 
93 Fertig (2009), 174. 
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counter to assumptions of early modern elites and some modern historians that pre-
modern rural people borrowed only as a last resort when they faced economic crisis or 
destitution.94 Among seventeenth-century Wildberg individuals, as Table 5 shows, less 
than 12 percent of those with under 100 fl total assets had debts, compared to 47 percent 
of those with over 100 fl. Among couples, the corresponding figures were 27 percent 
and 62 percent.  
The degree of borrowing also varied significantly and positively with wealth. 
Thus only about 7 percent of individuals with wealth under 100 fl had debts worth over 
10 percent of their wealth, compared to over 29 percent of individuals with wealth over 
100 fl; the corresponding figures for couples were 19 percent and 36 percent. This 
pattern was not unique to seventeenth-century Wildberg: higher borrowing among 
richer strata also emerges for villages in early modern Swabia95 and Switzerland.96 
There are two possible explanations for this: one is that borrowing required collateral, 
which was disproportionately available to the rich; the second is that poor people did 
borrow but sold off assets to repay debts, creating a large group of people with no assets 
and no debts. The first explanation is the more persuasive. For one thing, even if poor 
people did borrow and then repay by selling assets, it is the nature of cross-sectional 
sources such as inventories that we should observe some such persons in the period 
between borrowing and repaying; we observe few of them. Second, as we shall see in 
the next section, higher borrowing was associated not merely with higher total wealth 
but with ownership of specific asset categories that were durable and thus more 
susceptible to being used as collateral.  
                                                 
94 See the literature in Boelcke (1964), 324-35; Blömer (1990), 2-43; Boelcke (1991), 195, 198, 200, 202, 
207-11; Blessing (1997), 879. 
95 Sczesny (2002), 303. 
96 Pfister (1994), 1345 n. 22. 
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 Such findings already cast doubt on the idea that “over-indebtedness” was 
widespread among an ignorant, uncommercialized, and irrational rural population that 
did not know how to calibrate its borrowing to its economic means. Further doubts are 
raised by Table 6, which compares borrowing to ownership of real estate and moveable 
goods. Fewer than 10 percent of individuals and fewer than 14 percent of couples had 
debts exceeding the value of their real estate – and, as we saw in Tables 2-4, real estate, 
though important, was not the only store of value in Wildberg. “Excessive” borrowing 
thus appears to have been lower in this early modern German locality than in rural 
England at the same period: whereas in Wildberg 6.6 percent of individuals and 7.2 
percent of couples had debts worth more than the value of their moveable goods 
(including financial assets), the corresponding figure for early modern Yorkshire was 
significantly higher, at 15.7 percent.97 The credit market in seventeenth-century 
Württemberg was thus accessible to those without real estate, and even to those without 
any assets at all, but persons whose debts exceeded their total assets were rare and 
unfortunate cases. The evidence for seventeenth-century Wildberg provides no support 
for the view that over-indebtedness was widespread, that rural people were unable to 
adjust their debts to their economic capacities, or that borrowing was a negative 
economic indicator.98 
 
5. What Factors Were Associated with Borrowing? 
 
Borrowing was not rare in this less-developed economy. As Tables 2-6 show, it 
was undertaken by women and men; the unmarried, the married and the widowed; those 
entering marriage, those losing a spouse and those leaving life; those with no assets and 
                                                 
97 Sneath (2009), 165-6 (Table 31).  
98 For comparable findings from other Württemberg localities, see Boelcke (1964), 346; Maisch (1992), 
181. 
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those with many. Furthermore, the total value of borrowing was non-trivial relative to 
inventoried assets: in the 1,182 inventories for individuals in seventeenth-century 
Wildberg recording monetary values for all items, the value of debts amounted to 11.5 
percent of the value of total possessions; in the 638 inventories for couples, debts 
amounted to 13.4 of the value of total possessions. The average size of a single debt in 
an individual inventory was 13.6 inflation-adjusted Gulden (fl), in a couple inventory 
14.3 fl; this was nearly two times the annual cash wage of an average male servant in 
seventeenth-century Wildberg and over four times that of a female servant.99 This 
already casts doubt on any simple view that the pre-modern central European rural 
economy was financially inactive. 
But what variables were associated with higher or lower borrowing? Tables 2-6 
suggest that borrowing might have varied with sex, marital status, stage of life, and 
ownership of assets. But cross-tabulations can only suggest hypotheses; to test them and 
control for underlying variables, we need multivariate approaches. 
We do not know all possible influences on borrowing, and even the 
extraordinarily detailed Württemberg inventories do not contain data on all the factors 
that might have affected people’s decision to borrow. However, a large majority of the 
inventories for seventeenth-century Wildberg contain information about the value of 
borrowing, the value of possessions in different asset-categories, and a number of the 
characteristics of the inventoried individual or couple, derived either from the 
inventories or from other documentary sources such as tax registers, censuses, and 
parish registers.100  
                                                 
99 All values are in Württemberg Gulden (fl), indexed for inflation with 1565 as the index year. On 
servants’ wages see Ogilvie (2003), Table 3.8.  
100 On research strategy and record linkage between inventories and other documentary sources, see 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/Ogilvie_ESRC /index.html?page=about; and Küpker/Maegraith (2009). 
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A first step was to categorize each inventory according to whether it recorded 
the borrowing and possessions of an individual person or a couple. As Table 7 shows, 
662 documents containing marriage inventories (Beibringensinventuren) survive for 
Wildberg between 1602 and 1700. Of these, 2 contain only a combined list for the 
couple; 632 contain individualized lists for both bride and groom, 20 contain an 
individual list for the bride but not for the groom, and 8 contain an individual list for the 
groom but not the bride. Together, these 662 documents generate 634 couple-
inventories and 1,292 individual inventories (652 for brides and 640 for grooms). There 
are also 448 documents containing death inventories (Eventualteilungen and 
Realteilungen, in a range of variants). Of these, 304 are inventories for couples – most 
of them Eventualteilungen, which record a couple’s possessions on the occasion of the 
death of one member of that couple, but also a handful of Realteilungen in which both 
members of the couple died so close together that the inventory, although putatively that 
of the widow or widower, in fact records the possessions of the couple. The remaining 
144 are standard Realteilungen, listing the possessions of individuals at death – 93 
females and 51 males. Almost all were widowed persons, but the total does include 2 
bachelors and 4 spinsters. 
As already mentioned, although Württemberg inventories were supposed to 
record monetary values for all items, not all of them did so, especially in the early 
seventeenth century. Table 8 breaks down the 1,292 individual inventories and 634 
couple inventories for seventeenth-century Wildberg according to the proportion of 
items for which monetary values are recorded in the inventory. Among individual 
inventories, over 82 percent had values for all items, although it was much lower (58 
percent) among death inventories, mainly because these started being drawn up at an 
earlier date than the marriage inventories (of which 85 percent had values for all items). 
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Among couple inventories, 68 percent had complete values, again much higher for 
marriage inventories (75 percent) than death inventories (53 percent). Nonetheless, a 
good majority of inventories of all types – individual and couple, marriage and death – 
record complete monetary values for all items.  
Given that the most important characteristic of a debt is its monetary value, our 
multivariate analyses are restricted to those inventories for which such values are given. 
The result is that for 1,182 individuals and 638 couples inventoried at marriage or death 
in Wildberg between 1602 and 1700, we have information about the sums they had 
borrowed, the value of their possessions in different categories of asset, and a number of 
other characteristics, derived either from inventories or through record-linkage with tax 
registers, censuses, or parish registers.101 
The basis for our multivariate analysis was the hypothesis that people wished to 
smooth their consumption over time by borrowing, finance profitable investments that 
they could not fund from current resources, and spread risks by holding wealth in 
diverse forms including financial assets. However, their ability to do so was likely to be 
affected by their personal characteristics as well as by their demographic and economic 
circumstances. To explore the characteristics of borrowers in seventeenth-century 
Wildberg systematically, we estimated a regression in which the dependent variable was 
the inflation-adjusted value of the borrowing recorded in an inventory. We used a Tobit 
model because the dependent variable was left-censored, with zero borrowing in 74 
percent of individual inventories and 45 percent of couple inventories for which values 
of all items were recorded. 
To test the hypothesis that borrowing was influenced by personal characteristics, 
a first set of independent variables were sex and marital status (for individuals only) and 
                                                 
101 For research strategy and methods, see http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/Ogilvie_ESRC 
/index.html?page=about; and Küpker/Maegraith (2009). 
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(for both individuals and couples) occupation, migration status, life-cycle juncture of 
inventorying (marriage or death), number of living offspring, and number of non-
offspring heirs.  
To explore the hypothesis that people chose the amount they borrowed in 
combination with their choices about how to allocate their wealth among different asset 
types, a second set of independent variables consisted of the value of the individual’s 
(or couple’s) buildings, land, animals, cash, silver, financial assets, personal items 
(clothing, weapons, jewellery, etc.), and durable and non-durable household items. All 
values were indexed for inflation in order to allow for changes in the general price level 
across the period. Since our hypothesis is that these wealth variables were chosen 
together with the amount of borrowing, the regression results must of course be 
interpreted as multivariate correlations rather than unidirectional causal effects.  
To investigate whether the association between borrowing and asset categories 
differed between men and women, unmarried and widowed persons, or marriage and 
death inventories, we included interaction terms between the three binary variables (sex, 
marital status and inventory type) and all the asset variables.  
Since there were possible influences on borrowing that varied over time, such as 
the recurrent surges of warfare in central Europe during the seventeenth century, we 
included “date” as an independent variable. Our specification of this variable was one in 
which the effect of date on borrowing was allowed to differ between four periods, with 
break-points reflecting the major caesurae of seventeenth-century Württemberg history, 
at 1634 (Imperial invasion of the territory), 1648 (Peace of Westphalia), and 1687 
(French invasion).  
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We also postulated that borrowing might be affected by a person’s age. 
Inventories are often criticized for covering only older persons close to death.102 But, as 
discussed in Section 2.3, our inventories were generated at four life-cycle junctures – 
marriage, remarriage, widowhood, and death. As Table 9 shows, our inventories 
covered the entire spectrum of adult ages, from 17 to 76 years for marriage inventories 
and from 23 to 87 years for death inventories. For the inventories in which monetary 
values were recorded for all items, the family reconstitution yielded ages for 882 of the 
inventoried individuals (74.7 percent of the total) and for both spouses in 371 of the 
inventoried couples (58.2 percent of the total). Controlling for age enabled us both to 
address the criticism that inventory-studies reveal the decisions only of older persons 
close to death; and to explore the life-cycle of borrowing in this economy. 
We therefore began by estimating the regression for the data subsets for which 
age was known. For the 75 percent of individuals for which age was known, age had no 
statistically significant effect on borrowing. This enabled us to drop age as an 
independent variable for individuals.  
For the 58 percent of couples whose ages were known, by contrast, both 
husband’s and wife’s age did significantly affect borrowing. The coefficient on age 
itself was positive while the coefficient on the square of age was negative, indicating an 
inverted-U-shaped relationship between a couple’s age and the inflation-adjusted value 
of its borrowing. The estimated coefficients imply that borrowing peaked at 39.8 years 
for men and 49.8 years for women. Borrowing was thus higher for couples when 
husbands and wives were in middle life, and lower when they were young or old. A 
similar inverted-U-shaped age-profile of borrowing emerges from Pfister’s study of a 
                                                 
102 E.g. Frey (2000), 116. 
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Swiss proto-industrial village in the seventeenth century,103 and low borrowing in old 
age (though not in early adulthood) is found by Bracht and Fertig for nineteenth-century 
rural Westphalia.104 
Such an age profile was wholly rational given the typical life-cycle of a couple 
in this pre-modern economy. Formal human capital investment in youth was low: in 
early modern Württemberg, schooling was compulsory but ended at age 14; females 
typically received no further formal training because guilds excluded them; males 
followed apprenticeship and journeymanship but completed these before first marrying, 
which occurred on average at age 26 for both sexes in seventeenth-century Wildberg.105 
In middle life, most couples operated farm, craft and service businesses with high 
demand for production loans, high household dependency ratios, and peak credibility 
vis-à-vis external creditors. In old age, retirement was rare, implying relatively low 
“dissaving” until one’s final illness. This economic life-cycle made high borrowing in 
middle life rational for couples in this early modern rural economy, for reasons relating 
both to the demand for loans and the supply.  
We then formally explored the statistical effects of dropping age from the 
regression model, for two reasons. First, the data subset with known ages might differ 
systematically from the wider dataset (e.g. by excluding more migrants, whose ages 
were less often recorded in local documents). Second, the data subset with known ages 
excluded 42 percent of observations which, ideally, one would wish to include in the 
analysis. Formal tests demonstrated that for the data subset for which ages were known, 
excluding husband’s and wife’s age had no statistically significant influence on the 
estimates of the other independent variables. We therefore estimated the model for the 
entire sample, excluding the age variables, and compared the resulting estimated 
                                                 
103 Pfister (2007), 506. 
104 Bracht/Fertig (2008), 186-91. 
105 See Ogilvie (2003), chapters 2-3. 
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coefficients on the non-age variables with those obtained for the data subset for which 
ages were known. For almost all variables, the coefficients did not differ significantly 
between the two regressions. The estimated coefficients did differ significantly for three 
variables – number of children, value of silver, and time in the post-1687 period. We 
therefore employ caution in interpreting these coefficients in the model for the full 
dataset. 
We began by estimating the most general model, including all independent 
variables and interaction terms described above. We then excluded a number of 
variables from the Tobit regression on the basis of significance tests showing that their 
coefficients did not differ significantly different from zero, although some variables 
with statistically insignificant coefficients were retained on the grounds that their lack of 
significance was of particular analytical interest. Tables 10 and 11 report the resulting 
Tobit models, estimated for individuals and couples respectively. 
A first set of four variables was not significantly associated with borrowing for 
either individuals or couples: migration status for husbands, migration status for wives, 
number of live children, and number of non-child heirs. Early modern Wildberg thus 
provides no support for the hypothesis that migrants borrowed less because they were 
less integrated into local personalized lending networks. Nor does it support the view 
that individuals or couples substituted offspring or heirs for financial borrowing. 
A core set of seven variables, by contrast, were significantly associated with 
borrowing for both individuals and couples: the passage of time, proto-industrial 
occupation, inventory type, and value of buildings, financial assets, furniture, and silver. 
Two variables (sex and marital status) only applied to individuals, and a further three 
variables were significantly associated with borrowing for individuals but not for 
couples: land, personal possessions, and non-durable household goods. Conversely, 
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three variables were significantly associated with borrowing for couples but not for 
individuals: cattle, cash, and work-related tools and wares. 
The passage of time was significantly associated with borrowing for both 
individuals and couples. Borrowing fell significantly and substantially with each year 
that passed from 1602 to 1634. For individuals, there was a positive time-effect from 
1634 to 1648 (though of borderline significance) but no significant time-effect from 
1649 to 1687. For couples, there was no significant time-effect for the entire period of 
the Thirty Years War and the post-war aftermath, from 1634 to 1686. By contrast, 
borrowing rose again significantly with every year that passed from 1687 to 1700, albeit 
with borderline statistical significance for individuals.  
The expansion of borrowing described for the north Atlantic economies across 
the seventeenth century is thus not to be found in this region of rural central Europe, 
where borrowing fell from c. 1600 to 1634, did not change with time over the next half-
century, and only rose again after 1686. This time-pattern may reflect the catastrophic 
economic fallout of the Thirty Years War and the very slow post-war recovery in 
Württemberg. This interpretation is supported by micro-studies of eastern Swabia and 
Bavaria which find that the Thirty Years War decreased rural borrowing by reducing 
savings, depressing collateral values, and strangling capital markets,106 and by analyses 
of other pre-modern European economies also revealing withdrawal of credit in crisis 
periods.107 
A second variable associated with borrowing for both individuals and couples 
was proto-industrial occupation. As mentioned earlier, proto-industrial textile 
production was the single most important occupation in Wildberg, with about 40 
percent of household heads at least partially dependent upon worsted-weaving as a 
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livelihood, although many of them combined it with farming their own land.108 Record-
linkage enabled us to identify three main groups among those for whom inventories 
survive in seventeenth-century Wildberg: the definitely proto-industrial, those not 
recorded in either proto-industry or non-proto-industry, and those definitely pursuing 
non-proto-industrial occupations (the residual category in the regressions).109 
Theories of proto-industrialization describe the expansion of export-oriented 
cottage industries as bringing its practitioners into a harmful state of over-
indebtedness.110 The findings for seventeenth-century Wildberg cast doubt on this view. 
For couples, the effect of proto-industrial occupation compared to non-proto-industrial 
occupation was to reduce borrowing significantly, by 19.8 inflation-adjusted fl, a 
substantial effect given that mean total borrowing for couples was 61 inflation-adjusted 
fl. The effect for individuals was only of borderline significance and was also less 
substantial, with proto-industrial occupation associated with 2.5 fl less borrowing (a 
small difference given mean individual borrowing of 24 fl). Neither for couples nor for 
individuals do these findings provide any support for the view that export-oriented 
manufacturing dragged its practitioners into debt. If anything, in Wildberg it was quite 
the opposite: proto-industrial couples borrowed significantly and substantially less than 
non-proto-industrial couples. 
This finding cannot be dismissed by arguing that proto-industrial households 
were more likely to have highly liquid debts to merchants or large shopkeepers, as 
testified to by large stocks of raw material or merchandise in the household at the time 
of inventorying. There is no significant difference in the value of raw materials and 
merchandise between the proto-industrial and non-proto-industrial individuals in 
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seventeenth-century Wildberg inventories which record values for all items. Nor is it 
probable that this pattern of lower borrowing was caused by proto-industrialization 
diversifying incomes more than other occupations, since by-employments between 
farming and other livelihood sources were actually more common in Wildberg among 
traditional, locally-oriented craftsmen than among proto-industrial worsted-weavers.111 
Finally, the lower borrowing of the proto-industrial population cannot be 
ascribed to its relative poverty. It was certainly true that proto-industrial people in 
seventeenth-century Wildberg were poorer than their non-proto-industrial neighbours. 
The mean total wealth of the proto-industrial individuals was 137 fl, significantly lower 
than the mean of 279 fl for definitely non-proto-industrial individuals; the same was 
true of couples, with mean total wealth of 275 fl for the proto-industrial couples, 
significantly lower than the 573 fl for the definitely non-proto-industrial ones. However, 
the significantly lower borrowing of the proto-industrial population cannot be ascribed 
to its lower average wealth since the Tobit regressions control for wealth. Some other 
aspect of pursuing a proto-industrial occupation led to lower borrowing in seventeenth-
century Wildberg. 
A third variable associated with borrowing for both individuals and couples was 
the life-cycle juncture of the inventory. Borrowing was higher at death than at marriage 
by 17 fl for individuals (a large difference, given mean individual borrowing of 24 fl) 
and by 71 fl for couples (a very striking difference, given mean couple borrowing of 61 
fl). A possible explanation is that in death inventories the decrepitude of the recently 
deceased individual or spouse led to borrowing, a finding consistent with the medical 
and funeral expenses recorded as causes for borrowing in Table 1.112 Another probable 
influence, however, was economic substance. A newly married individual or couple had 
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not yet amassed the wealth or reputation need for collateral vis-à-vis prospective 
lenders; by the time of an individual’s or spouse’s death, by contrast, they had a more 
established position, facilitating borrowing. 
The association between borrowing and the value of people’s assets also differed 
significantly according to inventory type. A first asset category strongly associated with 
borrowing was buildings. At marriage, the value of one’s buildings was positively 
associated with the value of borrowing for both individuals and couples; at death, by 
contrast, the positive association emerged only for unmarried individuals, and was 
absent for widowed individuals and for couples. A similar pattern emerges for silver, 
which at marriage had a positive association with borrowing for individual males and 
for couples (though not for individual females); at death, by contrast, although the 
association was still significant for individual males, it was only of borderline 
significance for couples. Financial assets were likewise positively associated with 
borrowing for couples at marriage but not at death; for individuals, financial assets were 
positively associated with borrowing for the unmarried, but not for the widowed. 
Furniture, work-related tools and wares, and non-durable household goods, by contrast, 
were positively associated with borrowing for particular subsets of individuals or 
couples irrespective of the life-cycle juncture at which they were inventoried.  
The consistently positive association between the value of so many categories of 
assets and the value of individuals’ and couples’ inventoried debts points to the fact that 
borrowing in this economy was not associated with poverty or distress. Rather, 
borrowing was associated with ownership of the single largest and most important piece 
of real property (a house and its appurtenances), with precious metals, with financial 
assets, and with large amounts of valuable furniture (the most durable of household 
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moveables).113 As we shall see below, in analyzing the purposes of borrowing recorded 
in the inventories, people in seventeenth-century Wildberg sometimes borrowed money 
in order to buy buildings; but they did not borrow to buy silver plates or furniture. A 
more weighty explanation for the very pronounced association between buildings, 
silver, furniture, and financial assets on the one hand and borrowing on the other is that 
all these asset categories provided collateral to support higher borrowing. 
Collateral plays a role in most credit markets, of course. But studies of 
developing economies show it to be particularly important for access to credit where 
interest-rates cannot be adjusted to reflect the risks of lending.114 As discussed earlier, 
lenders in early modern Württemberg were legally prohibited from charging interest 
rates higher than 5 percent and could not enforce repayment of illegal loans made at 
higher rates. This rate ceiling probably created excess demand for loans, as suggested 
by borrowers’ willingness to pay higher rates illegally as well as by the higher interest 
rates prevailing in early modern Holland, Flanders and England, and in most parts of 
Germany in the nineteenth century.115 Interest-rate ceilings in early modern Germany 
are likely to have caused higher-risk borrowers to be either excluded altogether from 
access to credit, or forced to seek loans in the black market, at rates over the legal limit 
and without any of the benefits of legal protection.116 Studies of modern developing 
economies also find that legal interest-rate ceilings deter lenders from providing credit 
to poorer borrowers whose higher riskiness cannot legally be covered with higher 
expected returns, and thus bias credit provision toward those owning real estate or other 
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valuable collateral.117 Ownership of collateral may therefore have been so universally 
and strongly associated with borrowing in seventeenth-century Wildberg partly because 
the 5 percent legal interest-rate ceiling rationed credit for high-risk borrowers who could 
not offer substantial collateral. 
 In this context, it might seem odd that land, which could also be used as 
collateral, was not consistently associated with higher borrowing. Land was positively 
associated with borrowing for couples at death, but not for couples at marriage, and 
never for individuals. In the Wildberg context, however, this is not so surprising. 
Although most Wildberg citizens owned some land, few of them relied on it wholly for 
their livelihood, whereas almost all needed a building for their secondary or tertiary by-
employment.118 This is reflected in the fact that on average individuals owned 46 fl 
worth of buildings but only 35 fl worth of land; couples owned 120 fl worth of 
buildings but only 84 fl worth of land. Furthermore, by far the most common type of 
inventoried building was a “Behausung” (abode, dwelling), which often included a 
garden and agricultural infrastructure (barns, stables, sheds, manure-racks, etc.). In 
Wildberg, therefore, buildings typically included some land and also exceeded pure land 
in value, so buildings’ greater importance as collateral is hardly surprising. For a 
locality more dependent on full-time farming, pure land-ownership might well play the 
role that possession of a “Behausung” did in proto-industrial Wildberg.  
A second way in which people’s borrowing interacted with how they allocated 
their wealth among different asset types is revealed by the negative coefficients on two 
asset types which were particularly liquid – cash and cattle. Cash had a negative 
association with borrowing for both individuals and couples, although only for couples 
was it statistically significant. Cattle seem to have played the same role for couples, at 
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least in death inventories, where the more cattle a couple had, the lower its borrowing. 
These results mirror findings for economies as diverse as medieval Nürnberg,119 
sixteenth-century Württemberg,120 and early modern England,121 where cattle and cash 
also substituted for borrowing. One function of borrowing in the pre-modern rural 
economy, these findings suggest, was to enable households temporarily short of liquid 
resources – whether cash or cattle – to smooth consumption and make profitable 
investments which could not be funded from current resources. This is consistent with 
the idea that households borrowed to solve cash-flow problems, not because they were 
fundamentally lacking in valuable assets. 
Finally, the effects of gender and marital status on borrowing for individuals 
confirm and intensify the emerging pattern whereby borrowing in this pre-modern rural 
economy was associated not with poverty and disadvantage but with more substantial 
socio-economic status. Borrowing was significantly and substantially higher among 
males than females and among widowed individuals than among the unmarried. This 
cannot be dismissed by arguing that when a man and a woman were married, a 
disproportionate share of their debts would be held in the name of the man. Most 
marriage inventories listed the bride’s and the groom’s possessions separately precisely 
in order to maintain clearly demarcated property rights between the two spouses 
throughout the ensuing marriage. Although unmarried females were not totally excluded 
from the credit market – about seven percent of them entered marriage with debts – 
their borrowing was significantly lower than that of unmarried males or than widowed 
individuals of either sex. Unmarried males in turn had significantly and substantially 
lower borrowing than widowed individuals of either sex. Interestingly, marital status 
was more significantly associated with borrowing than was gender, as shown by the fact 
                                                 
119 Schuster (2008), 43-4. 
120 Boelcke (1964), 322. 
121 Muldrew (1998), ch. 4. 
 39
that once an individual achieved widowed status, borrowing did not differ significantly 
between the sexes.  
These findings are consistent with Mauch’s findings for the Württemberg village 
of Beuren, where in 1846-54 the mean mortgage debt was significantly lower for 
females and for persons who had achieved the married (or widowed) state.122 They are 
also consistent with qualitative and quantitative evidence on the institutional 
disadvantages suffered by females and unmarried persons in the pre-modern 
Württemberg economy.123 Females were subject to gender guardianship which hindered 
them from transacting as independent legal agents.124 They were excluded by guilds and 
other occupational associations from most craft, proto-industrial, commercial and 
professional occupations.125 Despite their equal inheritance rights under the 
Württemberg partible inheritance system, other institutions caused women’s property 
rights to be less secure than men’s.126 And females lacked any voice in the powerful 
community councils that regulated most factor and product markets in rural 
Württemberg.127 All these disadvantages made women poorer and riskier borrowers, 
deterring lenders. Marital status was also associated with noticeable economic 
disadvantages in pre-modern Württemberg, particularly community and guild rules 
preventing never-married persons from practising most occupations independently.128 
Both sets of institutional disadvantages coincided for unmarried females who, when 
they sought to conduct a livelihood independently outside a household headed by a male 
relative or master, were pejoratively dubbed Eigenbrötlerinnen (literally, “own-
breaders”) and persecuted at the discretion of communal, guild, religious and 
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governmental authorities.129 Lower borrowing by females and the unmarried – and 
lower willingness to lend to them – was rational, given these severe institutional and 
economic restrictions. The pronounced positive effects of male gender and ever-married 
status on the value of one’s borrowing provide further confirmation that in this pre-
modern rural economy borrowing was associated with a higher, not a lower, socio-
economic position. 
 
6. Characteristics of Debts 
 
These econometric findings illuminate the variables associated with high or low 
borrowing for individuals and couples – gender, age, marital status, occupation, date, 
and portfolio composition. But what about the debts themselves – their purposes, their 
formality, their impersonality? To address these questions, we analyse the debts 
recorded in Wildberg inventories between 1602 and 1700. These inventories listed a 
total of 8,206 separate debts, but for 26 of them no monetary value was recorded. The 
analysis below is restricted to the 8,180 inventoried debts for which monetary values are 
known. 
 
6.1. Why Did People Borrow? 
 
Early modern elites thought that peasants borrowed to indulge in consumption beyond 
their means.130 Historians traditionally assumed that rural people borrowed mainly to 
survive consumption crises because they were poor.131 To find out why people actually 
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borrowed in seventeenth-century Wildberg, Tables 12 and 13 categorize inventoried 
debts according to their purpose. Table 12 breaks down the 8,180 debts by number, 
while Table 13 breaks them down by value. 
 Not all inventoried debts had specific purposes recorded. Among the 8,180 debts 
recorded in the inventories of seventeenth-century Wildberg for which monetary values 
were given, about 30 percent by value were described only in general terms (capital 
sum, interest payments, instalments, etc.), in which capital sums made up two-thirds of 
the category. Another 24 percent of debts by value were described only in terms of the 
creditor, in which debts to private persons comprised over two-thirds of the category. 
However, another 17 percent by value of the debts that had no purpose recorded were 
owed to officials and institutions, and may thus be assumed to be largely to cover fiscal 
demands, although in some cases they reflected a sum of capital borrowed from a public 
office. Even these debts whose purpose was not otherwise recorded thus reveal one 
reason for borrowing in this economy, as in many other parts of seventeenth-century 
Germany – the expanding activities of the early modern state.132 
 In Wildberg inventories, 38 percent of debts by number and 47 percent by value 
– 3,147 individual debts – recorded a clear, specific purpose. It might seem regrettable 
that we know the purposes of less than half of debts by value, and it is possible that this 
47 percent may be unrepresentative. However, this proportion of known purposes for 
borrowing is extremely high compared to most other historical debt studies and thus 
sheds light on a facet of early modern borrowing behaviour which is almost wholly 
obscure in the historiography, at least in terms of quantitative analyses.133 Furthermore, 
the fact that virtually all conceivable purposes for borrowing are recorded at least once 
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in the inventories for seventeenth-century Wildberg suggests that there is no particular 
type of purpose that was systematically left unrecorded. 
The top panels of Tables 12 and 13 categorize the recorded purposes of 
inventoried debts into consumption, production, and “mixed” purposes. In early modern 
households, of course, production and consumption were closely linked. Consequently, 
many debts – such as those for buildings (used for both residence and work) and 
animals (producers of food, draught power, and industrial materials) – had to be 
categorized as “mixed”. 
 The most salient class of “mixed” debts were for buildings, though these 
declined from around 50 percent of specific-purpose debts by value before mid-century 
to 42 percent thereafter. A second important class of “mixed” debts were for inheritance 
claims, which made up 8 percent of specific-purpose debts by value across the century, 
though much higher percentages during and immediately after the Thirty Years War, 
probably as fallout from high wartime mortality. Taxes comprised a third notable 
“mixed” purpose, rising significantly from only 2 percent of specific-purpose debts by 
value before 1634 to 10 percent after 1687. Debts caused by tax demands had a long 
tradition in Germany, reaching back into the fifteenth century.134 But these quantitative 
findings for Wildberg between 1602 and 1700 suggest that the accelerating growth of 
the seventeenth-century state was a major influence on private borrowing in early 
modern Germany.135 
 Was it true that early modern rural people borrowed mainly for consumption – 
either to stave off starvation or to purchase luxuries beyond their means – and hence 
that most borrowing was for non-productive purposes? The answer is no. Production 
debts comprised 23 percent of specific-purpose debts by value, compared to only 10 
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percent for consumption debts. Only in the worst wartime period (1634-48) did 
consumption and production account for nearly equal proportions (10 and 11 percent 
respectively), while in peacetime (1602-33, 1649-86) production debts were nearly three 
times as high as consumption debts. The share of consumption debts only rose after 
1687, and even then remained lower than production debts. Even if some part of the 
“cloth” and “textile intermediate” debts were to be shifted from the “production” to the 
“consumption” category, since they are not in all cases unambiguously described as 
being owed by textile workers for professional purposes, consumption debts would still 
comprise a lower proportion than production debts for Wildberg borrowers in all 
periods of the seventeenth century. 
 The same low proportion of consumption debts compared to production debts as 
we observe in seventeenth-century Wildberg also emerges from the east Swabian 
village of Langenneufnach in the eighteenth century,136 Göttingen in 1676-1755,137 Harz 
mining villages in the early nineteenth century,138 and the Württemberg village of 
Beuren in 1846-54.139 These German findings contrast intriguingly with the primacy of 
consumption loans in probate accounts in seventeenth-century England, notoriously one 
of the cradles of the early modern Consumer Revolution.140 People in early modern 
rural Württemberg did borrow to bridge consumption gaps, and even occasionally for 
luxuries such as clothing or weddings, but they borrowed much more often to invest in 
their own productive capacities. 
 Breaking down production loans between sectors (by value) yields just over one-
third for agricultural purposes and just under two-thirds for industrial ones. Agricultural 
loans comprised those for land, two-thirds of the wage bill (the “unskilled” share), and 
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half the “miscellaneous production” category, totalling 8.6 percent of specific-purpose 
loans. Industrial loans comprised those for cloth, intermediate textile inputs, worsted-
trading, the leather industry, tools, one-third of the wage bill (the “skilled” share), and 
raw materials, totalling 14.7 percent of specific-purpose loans. Since production loans 
comprised 23 percent of the total value of specific-purpose loans, agriculture accounted 
for just over one-third of them and industry for just under two-thirds. Even if “animals” 
were to be shifted from the “mixed” to the “production” category, as suggested by the 
widespread practice of borrowing on cattle in other pre-modern German economies, 
agriculture would only comprise 10.7 percent of the value of specific-purpose loans, 
still considerably less than industry.141  
This finding, that loans for industrial production surpassed those for agricultural 
production, is consistent with the importance of proto-industry in this region in the 
seventeenth century and the low agricultural productivity growth in Württemberg as a 
whole before c.1850.142 It is borne out by Mauch’s findings for a (mainly agricultural) 
Württemberg village in the mid-nineteenth century, where craftsmen were 
disproportionately strongly represented among debtors.143 But it contrasts intriguingly 
with the importance of agriculture-related loans in early modern Flanders, Holland, and 
England.144 
 The findings for Wildberg also illustrate the importance of credit in facilitating 
the operation of other factor markets, particularly those for land but also those for 
labour. Loans for various forms of real estate (buildings, land and mixed real estate) 
made up a total of 53 percent of specified-purpose loans by value; the real estate market 
evidently relied heavily on borrowing. But even labour markets were assisted by credit 
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markets, as shown by the fact that 13 percent of specific-purpose loans by number and 3 
percent by value were for wages, both skilled and unskilled.145  
 When it came to consumption, did people borrow for luxury or display, the 
objection so often levelled at peasant borrowing by pre-modern elites?146 Again the 
answer is no. The largest tranche of consumption-debts was for grain and comestibles, 
which made up four-fifths of consumption-related borrowing by value. Some grain may 
have been purchased as seed, which would make it a production-debt, but even with the 
relatively low Württemberg yield ratio of 5:1 most grain would have been for 
consumption.147 Borrowing to buy grain occurred not because people were too 
improvident to store food, since Table 4 showed stocks of grain and comestibles in one-
third of Wildberg couples’ inventories at marriage and two-thirds at death; Maisch 
found the same for eighteenth-century Württemberg villagers.148 Debts to buy food 
more probably arose, therefore, from temporary cash-flow problems. 
By comparison, debts for luxury and display – the clothing, weddings, and 
funerals castigated by seventeenth-century Württemberg elites and penalized in the 
sumptuary ordinances – made up only 2 percent of the value of all debts for known 
purposes, providing no evidence of any early modern “consumer revolution” fuelled by 
expanding credit. This is consistent with other Württemberg studies emphasizing the 
role of sumptuary regulations in constraining the consumption behaviour of ordinary 
people (especially in rural communities) and dating the spread of fashionable luxuries 
only to the later eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries.149 
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6.2. Were Debts Documented? 
 
But does all this borrowing in rural Württemberg testify to the existence of highly 
developed, formal credit markets of the sort described for early modern France, 
England, or the Low Countries? Debt documentation is widely regarded as an indicator 
of the existence of a more formal credit market in which borrowing is more often 
intermediated, repayment is more easily enforced, and written financial instruments can 
be endorsed for transfer to third parties.150  
By this measure, as Tables 14 and 15 show, borrowing in seventeenth-century 
Wildberg was not highly formal, with only 4.7 percent of inventoried debts by value 
(2.6 percent by number) making any mention of documentation. This is very low 
compared to other early modern economies. In early modern rural Flanders, for 
instance, three-quarters of debts in probate inventories were documented as bonds or 
annuities,151 and in early modern Kent over one-quarter of debts in probate accounts 
were recorded as being supported by documentary instruments.152  
 This is not to say that debt documentation was wholly unavailable in early 
modern Württemberg. The debts recorded in Württemberg inventories may have been 
largely unsupported by debt-specific documentation, but this does not mean that they 
were informal. The very fact that they were recorded in inventories drawn up by 
inventory-makers (who were community officials) and written and signed by the town 
clerk (who was a state bureaucrat), provided them with a strong degree of formality, 
albeit of a different type than manifested in the credit instruments so much more 
common in the early modern Low Countries or England. 
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Furthermore, the few Wildberg debts that were explicitly supported by 
additional documentation testify to the use of various types of account, register, 
inheritance record, legal court record, and miscellaneous documents ranging from the 
informal “Zettel” (slip of paper) to the formal “Urkunde” (debt certificate), “Gült” or 
“Obligation” (bond), or “Kontrakt” (contract). Closer analysis shows an intriguing 
pattern: most of these documents were not specific to the credit market. Rather, they had 
been generated for other purposes, often by state or community offices. Thus over 44 
percent of all debts mentioning documentation were supported by “accounts”, over one-
third of those being from state and community offices, the remainder from shopkeepers 
and craftsmen. A second major tranche (over 13 percent of debts mentioning 
documentation) was supported by other miscellaneous public documents – extracts, 
letters, lists, specifications. A third major tranche (over 10 percent of debts mentioning 
documentation) referred to the public administration of the inheritance system, 
particularly inventories and inheritance-divisions. A fourth tranche (over 5 percent) 
referred to “registers”, mainly those of state and community offices. Only the 24 percent 
of documented debts in the “miscellaneous private” category – less than 1 percent of 
total debts by value – were supported by any of the debt-specific instruments associated 
with the expansion of private finance in some other early modern European economies 
– annuities, bonds, debentures, deeds, letters of exchange, and so on.153  
 In this respect, Württemberg differed from societies such as early modern France 
or the post-French-Revolution Rhineland, where debts were documented in notarial 
registers, although in such societies inventories and other sources also reveal non-trivial 
proportions of non-documented debts.154 Württemberg also differed from early modern 
                                                 
153 Holderness (1976), 98-101; Muldrew (1998), 103-19; Spufford (2000), 215-19; Lambrecht (2009), 76-
8; Thoen/Soens (2009), 22; Limberger (2009), 65-9. 
154 Gilomen (1998), 136-7; Clemens/Reupke (2008), 223; Béaur (2009), 153, 155; Schofield/Lambrecht 
(2009), 4-5. 
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Flanders, where village clerks earned fees by writing up private debt contracts and 
peasants used non-documented IOUs only for small loans.155 Württemberg differed 
from Holland, too, where early modern village debt consisted heavily of documented 
annuities.156 And Württemberg differed from England, where although oral debt 
agreements were widespread, by the seventeenth century much borrowing was 
supported using sophisticated, credit-specific documentation.157 Nor is there any 
evidence for early modern Wildberg of the use of negotiable debt instruments, of the 
type that were emerging in the North Atlantic economies in this period. 
Some of the institutional features discussed earlier may have contributed to this 
relative paucity of credit-market-specific debt documentation in early modern 
Württemberg. As already mentioned, no ordinary citizen in Württemberg was allowed 
to borrow on a bond without approval from his community court for small sums and 
from the princely government for larger ones.158 The rules governing letters of exchange 
(Wechselbriefe) were even more restrictive: only merchants and other high-status 
persons could use these freely, while “craftsmen and other ordinary citizens and 
farmers” had to get a special permit.159 Obtaining such permits was expensive, as was 
the step of obtaining a formal debt certificate, for whose writing fees had to be paid to 
the public secretary’s office.160 
A further contributory factor may have been that the exhaustive public record-
keeping in early modern Württemberg meant that most debts were in fact already 
recorded in public documentation, including marriage and death inventories themselves. 
The comprehensive documentary coverage provided by the high level of 
                                                 
155 Lambrecht (2009), 78 (Table 5.1), 91-3. 
156 Zuijderduijn (2009), 41-6. 
157 Holderness (1976), 98-101; Muldrew (1998), 103-19; Spufford (2000), 215-19. 
158 Reyscher (1828ff), 6:629, #422 (14.04.1781). 
159 Reyscher (1828ff), 6:534-9, #397 (24.03.1759).  
160 Reyscher (1828ff), 6:714, #455 (17.03.1798). 
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bureaucratization already observable in seventeenth-century Württemberg may have 
reduced incentives to develop the sophisticated private debt instruments of England or 
the Low Countries, or the quasi-private notarial instruments of France and the French-
influenced Rhineland. As we have seen, when foreign notaries began to operate in 
Württemberg in the 1790s, legislation was passed to forbid or severely restrict their 
activities.161 The Württemberg government required debt documentation to be written 
up only by official public clerks (Amtschreiber) and sealed and certified only by 
princely or communal officials.162 Communal and state officials in Württemberg may 
even have played the debt-brokerage role in early modern Germany and Switzerland163 
that notaries played in France,164 county attorneys in England,165 or village clerks in 
Flanders.166  
 
6.3. Was Borrowing Personalized? 
 
A rather different indicator of the formality or otherwise of credit markets is the extent 
to which credit extends beyond the boundaries of family and community. On the one 
hand, economists view extending credit ties beyond the family or community as 
important for rural development.167 On the other, anthropologists regard placing credit 
in the hands of outsiders (Jews in Europe, Chinese in southeast Asia, Hausa and 
Lebanese in west Africa) as enabling traditional societies to export potentially 
conflictual relationships outside the family and neighbourhood.168 
                                                 
161 Reyscher (1828ff), 6:705-6, #449 (2.12.1795). 
162 Reyscher (1828ff), 12:364-5, #214 (11.11.1621). 
163 Pfister (1994), 1348. 
164 Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2004), 388-9. 
165 Holderness (1976). 
166 Lambrecht (2009), 91-3. 
167 See World Bank (1989); Basu (1997), 267-80; Ray (1998), 529-84. 
168 Binnenkade (2007), 165-6. 
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Tables 16 and 17 breaks down borrowing in seventeenth-century Wildberg 
according to the relationship between borrower and creditor. A first step is to categorize 
the creditors from whom Wildberg inhabitants had borrowed into persons, officials, 
institutions (guilds, religious foundations), and groups (children in guardianship, sets of 
heirs).  
It might be argued that this exercise does not provide useful information because 
particular sources of credit were likely to go disproportionately unrecorded: landlords 
might forgive rent due, relatives might keep loans informal and thus not report them to 
inventory-makers, shopkeepers or other suppliers might provide short-term credit that 
was repaid before the inventory was drawn up, or creditors for very small debts might 
not report them. However, there is no evidence that this occurred. As Tables 12-13 
already showed, Zins (which included rents on land) comprised a non-trivial proportion 
of debts,169 and debts to shopkeepers for “wares” were frequently listed. Creditors did in 
fact report very small debts in their debtors’ inventories: in the seventeenth-century 
Wildberg inventories, debts worth as little as 0.003 fl were recorded, 58 percent of all 
debts were below 1 fl, and 78 percent were below 3 fl. Relatives, too, as we shall see in 
this section, did insist that debts due to them be included among the claims in an 
inventory. There is no evidence that any particular type of creditor – landlords, relatives, 
shopkeepers, suppliers, or small creditors – was left unrecorded. 
Contrary to the assumption that pre-modern rural borrowing was highly 
personalized, nearly 19 percent of Wildberg debts by value were owed to non-personal 
creditors (mostly institutions and officials), rising from 11 percent in the first half of the 
century to nearly 23 percent 1649-86 and over 29 percent after 1687. Most of these 
debts to institutions and officials derived from arrears in payments of fiscal demands, 
                                                 
169 In Tables 12 and 13, the rubric “Zins, no further description” includes “Zins” both in the sense of 
“interest on a debt” and in the sense of “rents or dues paid on land”. The German terminology does not 
permit further disambiguation. 
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although some arose because the borrower had taken out a loan from the funds of a 
public institution. The proportion of “impersonal” debts in this economy was thus non-
trivial and rising. However, this was not because the growth of the market was 
encouraging exchange with strangers but rather because the growth of the state was 
swelling fiscal demands and increasing borrowing from public institutions.  
 Only about 81 percent of debts by value in seventeenth-century Wildberg were 
therefore owed to creditors who were persons, and even fewer – only about 18 percent – 
were owed to persons recorded as being linked to borrowers through kinship, 
employment, or guardianship. Table 17 shows that this proportion varied from one 
period to another, but showed no clear trend across the century, with the highest share 
of “personalized” borrowing in the 1602-33 period but the lowest proportion in the 
1634-48 period, and intermediate proportions in second half of the century. Of course, 
these fluctuations may merely result from unsystematic recording. But insofar as they 
reflect economic practice, they cast doubt on two widely held views. First, borrowing 
was not predominantly personalized, since less than one-fifth of borrowing in Wildberg 
occurred between persons with recorded relationships. And second, borrowing was not 
becoming more impersonal over time, since both the highest and the lowest proportions 
of personalized borrowing occurred in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
Furthermore, Maisch’s study of another Württemberg rural community found 13-16 
percent of inventoried borrowing among kin in the eighteenth century, almost identical 
to the proportion in post-1650 Wildberg.170 
 A somewhat different measure of impersonality is the degree to which debt 
relationships extend beyond the local community.171 Tables 18 and 19 break down 
borrowing in seventeenth-century Wildberg according to whether it was recorded as 
                                                 
170 Maisch (1992), 181-2. 
171 Hoffman/Postel-Vinay/Rosenthal (2004), 388-9; Zuijderduijn (2009), 153-5. 
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being undertaken within the locality or outside it. Less than 18 percent of Wildberg 
borrowing by value took place within the community. The proportion of borrowing that 
was definitely within the community actually rose over time, from 13-15 percent before 
1649 to 17-27 percent in the second half of the century. Even assuming that all 
borrowing with unrecorded locality was actually within Wildberg shows the highest 
proportion (79 percent) in the post-1687 period. These findings are consistent with the 
high proportions of intracommunal borrowing found in nineteenth-century Württemberg 
villages by both Maisch and Mauch, based on different documentary sources, 
suggesting that they reflect economic practice rather than recording conventions.172 It 
contrasts, however, with the low proportions (6-26 percent) of intracommunal 
borrowing found by Fertig in nineteenth-century Westphalia,173 and by Clemens and 
Reupke for the nineteenth-century Saarland174 – admittedly for larger loans secured with 
real property or recorded by notaries. 
At least in seventeenth-century Württemberg, borrowing was not predominantly 
personalized. But nor did it become more impersonal as the early modern period passed. 
On the contrary. The proportion of borrowing between relatives fluctuated 
unsystematically across the seventeenth century in Wildberg, and literature on other 
localities suggests that it remained at similar levels well into the eighteenth. The 
proportion of borrowing between members of the same community actually increased in 
Wildberg across the seventeenth century, and literature on other localities shows the 
proportion remaining high into the nineteenth. Personalized borrowing in this economy 
was thus not the dominant pattern; but nor is there any evidence of depersonalization 
across the early modern period. 
 
                                                 
172 Maisch (1992), 180-2 with Tab 4.4.7.a; Mauch (2009), 47-8, 79. 
173 Fertig (2008), 168, 171-2; Fertig (2009), 179-80, 189-90. 
174 Clemens/Reupke (2008), 224-5, 228. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
What can we conclude from these findings about financial activity in the “less 
developed” rural interior of early modern Europe? Württemberg was a relatively 
undynamic economy compared to Flanders, Holland, England, or many parts of France 
in the early modern period.175 Nonetheless, borrowing was widespread, even in a remote 
rural community such as Wildberg. Borrowing was undertaken by women as well as 
men, the poor as well as the rich, young adults and the elderly, before marriage and near 
death, and by persons of all marital statuses. Although few lifelong celibates were 
inventoried, those that were recorded had all borrowed money, indicating that at least 
some even of this disadvantaged group had access to credit.176 Almost every 
demographic and economic subgroup that was inventoried was able to borrow, and 
could thus smooth consumption, finance investments, and diversify risks.177 In so doing, 
they enabled other rural people to hold their savings in financial form and diversify their 
investments.178 In this, Württemberg resembles many other medieval and early modern 
European rural societies,179 but contrasts sharply with less-developed economies where 
many people – especially women and the poor – are constrained to consume what they 
themselves produce and can only expand production using their own hoarded savings.180  
 Credit markets in seventeenth century Württemberg were also quite variegated. 
Borrowing was not conducted purely on the basis of personalized relationships, but 
encompassed a wide range of institutions, groups, and individuals. People borrowed 
                                                 
175 See, on different aspects, Ogilvie (1997); Ogilvie (2010). 
176 On the parlous position of the independent unmarried in pre-modern Württemberg, see Ogilvie (2003), 
ch. 6. 
177 As also found for sixteenth-century rural Württemberg by Boelcke (1964), 336. 
178 Boelcke (1964), 336. 
179 Gilomen (1998), 127; Muldrew (1998), chs. 3-4; Postel-Vinay (1998); Spufford (2000). 
180 World Bank (1989); Basu (1997), 267-80 Chayanov (1986), 5; Brunner (1986), 107; 
Kriedte/Medick/Schlumbohm (1981), 53; Figes (1989), 12; Pallot (1999), 14-16. 
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from the state, the community, the church, and the officials who conducted the finances 
of these institutions – even if this “borrowing” often consisted of getting into arrears 
with taxes or dues. They also borrowed from religious funds, charitable foundations, 
hospitals, and guilds – here, as in many other pre-modern German-speaking 
territories.181 They borrowed from groups of heirs or children in guardianship whose 
inheritances were typically lent out at interest.182 And they borrowed from other 
individuals – a testimony to the savings potential of rural people, even in relatively 
slow-growing early modern German economies.  
 The individuals ready and willing to provide credit in early modern Wildberg 
were also highly various, with the vast majority consisting not of family members or 
other close associates, but people with whom the borrower had no recorded relationship 
other than the debt itself. Well over one-quarter of borrowing by value was undertaken 
with creditors outside the local community. Nor does early modern Wildberg show any 
sign of being dominated by a Dorfkönig (village king) who monopolized local lending. 
As Boelcke found for the sixteenth century, rural Württemberg was teeming with a 
diversity of lenders, even the largest of whom did not monopolize supply.183 In this 
respect, early modern Württemberg resembled seventeenth-century Swiss Ebikon,184 the 
seventeenth-century Swabian village of Langenneufnach,185 and Fertig’s nineteenth-
century Westphalian villages.186 This was not the type of rural economy described for 
modern developing economies, where local lending is often dominated by a single 
                                                 
181 Boelcke (1964), 321, 325-9; Wunder (1987), 36; Blömer (1990), 44-61; Ineichen (1992), 78-80; 
Winnige (1996), 361-75, 395-404; Sczesny (2002), 295-6, 301; Binnenkade (2007), 164-5; Häberlein 
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182 For similar findings, see Maisch (1992), 184-5; Sczesny (2002), 296, 301-02. 
183 Boelcke (1964), esp. 336-41.  
184 Ineichen (1992), 81. 
185 Sczesny (2002), 302, 313-14. 
186 Fertig (2008), 172; Fertig (2009), 189-91, 194. 
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village money-lender who can charge ruinously high interest-rates and keep peasants in 
“debt peonage” because he has no competitors.187 
 Within this reasonably diversified Württemberg credit market, people behaved 
in ways consistent with the basic economic hypotheses about borrowing with which this 
paper began. Borrowing was not an indicator of distress or crisis.188 Rather, it was 
higher for the owners of buildings, silver, and other durable and valuable assets, for 
males, for those who had achieved the married state, for substantial couples in middle 
life, and for other relatively well-off groups such as those in non-proto-industrial 
occupations. Associated as it was with economic substance rather than impoverishment, 
borrowing rarely meant economic ruin or even the “over-indebtedness” criticized by 
medieval and early modern elites and lamented by some modern historians.189 The vast 
majority of borrowers in seventeenth-century Wildberg were evidently rational enough 
to avoid anything remotely approaching the risk of debt peonage or even insolvency, 
and the vast majority of lenders supplied loans only to the financially sound.  
 The composition of inventoried debts also suggests that borrowing was 
undertaken as a positive strategy to serve productive purposes. Borrowing made it 
possible to smooth consumption over time, funding purchases of necessities and 
enabling minor discretionary spending on clothing, medical care, weddings, and 
funerals. Borrowing also enabled people to smooth payment of the rising burden of 
taxes extorted by the early modern state. But above all, borrowing facilitated profitable 
investments, enabling farmers to purchase land and animals, employers to pay servants 
and labourers, and rural artisans to finance the delay between buying inputs and selling 
                                                 
187 Basu (1997), 267-80.  
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industrial goods. In short, credit markets made markets in land, labour, and output work 
better. In the absence of such micro-credit, many small farmers and rural craftsmen in 
developing economies are forced to close down operations periodically because of cash-
flow problems.190 The ubiquitous household borrowing we observe in seventeenth-
century Wildberg played a positive role in enabling economic agents to survive as well 
as they did. 
 But borrowing in early modern Württemberg also – unsurprisingly – had a 
darker side. The fact that borrowing was associated with a more substantial socio-
economic status meant that if you were female, never-married, very young, very old, 
propertiless, or proto-industrial, it could be difficult to obtain credit.191 The 5 percent 
interest-rate ceiling enforced by the Württemberg state was significantly lower than 
legal ceilings (or actual interest rates charged) in early modern England, Flanders, or 
Holland. It was probably inappropriately low for the Württemberg economy in the 
seventeenth century, as shown by the evidence that poor borrowers sought to borrow in 
the black market at implicit interest-rates that violated the rate-ceiling.192 As in modern 
developing economies, the low interest-rate ceiling in seventeenth-century Württemberg 
probably rationed credit to higher-risk borrowers such as women, the young, the elderly, 
the poor, and the propertiless, pushing them into the informal sector where they were 
more exposed to exploitation.193  
 The credit market in seventeenth-century Württemberg appears not to have been 
as extensive or variegated as that of many North Atlantic economies and shows little 
sign of becoming more impersonal, intermediated, or formal over the period analysed 
here. In the early modern Netherlands, for instance, even poor families got credit via 
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mechanisms not recorded for inhabitants of early modern Wildberg, including 
pawnshops and the formal credit markets of the public debt.194 During a century in 
which English, Dutch, Flemish and French credit markets enjoyed a growing 
impersonality and sophistication which extended into the countryside, in Wildberg the 
proportion of extra-familial or extra-communal debt did not increase.  
Nor do the debts recorded in Wildberg inventories show the level or 
sophistication of documentary support observed in England, the Low Countries, or 
France at the same period. Most forms of debt documentation mentioned for ordinary 
people in this German region were generated by bureaucratic accounts, official 
registers, or public administration of the inheritance system. Inventoried debts recorded 
few credit-market-specific documents hinting at formal or endorsable financial 
instruments.195 This is not surprising, given Württemberg legislation requiring ordinary 
people to obtain communal or state permission before borrowing money even on bonds, 
let alone on more sophisticated credit instruments. Whether the institutional 
arrangements observed in this early modern German economy offered mechanisms for 
smoothing economic decisions and managing risks that (despite their differences) were 
as effective as those in the north Atlantic economies, or whether these differences 
alternatively contributed to slower German growth and development, poses a challenge 
for future comparative research. 
  
                                                 
194 McCants (2007), 10, 21. 
195 One avenue for future research is to explore lending from the other side, by analysing the financial 
assets listed in inventories, to see if the same pattern of financial documentation is observable on this side 
of the Württemberg rural credit market. 
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Table 1:
Population, Taxpayers, and Land Ownership, Wildberg, 1565-1889
Year
Number of 
taxpayers
Number of 
taxpayers with 
land
Per cent of 
taxpayers with 
land
Total number of 
inhabitants
1565 227 159 70 -
1594 250 222 89 830
1599 283 - - 750
1614 327 158 48 -
1629 401 190 47 1542
1639 340 - - 1005
1640 340 - - 1005
1642 307 - - 1005
1643 302 - - 1005
1645 293 177 60 -
1665 322 - - 1405
1686 324 181 56 1566
1695 275 167 61 995
1705 308 - - 1295
1711 332 - - 1333
1722 372 - - 1363
1737 354 - - 1386
1740a 289 182 63 1402
1740b 363 - - 1402
1744 368 - - 1477
1748 387 - - 1501
1753 424 - - 1460
1757 384 - - 1522
1760 390 - - 1468
1770 429 - - 1524
1780 588 - - 1629
1807 503 - - 1533
1824 437 296 68 1786
1831 443 288 65 1922
1841 444 318 72 1599
1850 408 294 72 1520
1860 383 292 76 1459
1870 419 293 70 1453
1880 423 302 71 1422
1889 415 273 66 1419
Notes:
Includes only taxpayers who are 'Bürger' (those with community citizenship rights) or 'Beisitzer'  (those
with legal settlement rights). Excludes inhabitants of other communities paying tax on pieces of property 
in Wildberg. Wildberg had an average of 3.8 inhabitants per taxpayer.
Two different tax registers were drawn up in 1740: the first (1740a) provided a detailed breakdown of all
items of taxable wealth while the second (1740b) provided summary information only.
Source:
Taxpayers: HStAS A573 Bü. 1055-1145 (Steuerregister); HStAS A573 Bü. 5415 
(Vermögensverzeichnisse); HStAS A573a Nr 197, 204 (Steuerregister).
Population: Ogilvie/Küpker/Maegraith (2009), Table 1.
Figure 1: Percentage of taxpayers inventoried at least once, Wildberg, 1565-1744
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Table 2:
Individuals at Marriage, Ownership of Various Asset Categories, Wildberg, 1602-1700
Type of Item Unmarried Widowed Unknown Total
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Financial liabilities (Passiva ) 85 18 40 7 149 88 68 67 5 50 1 13 239 37 109 17
Financial assets (Aktiva ) 110 24 118 22 102 60 63 62 7 70 1 13 219 34 182 28
Both Passiva  & Aktiva 38 8 17 3 94 55 46 46 5 50 0 0 137 21 63 10
Cash 216 47 336 62 59 35 49 49 1 10 4 50 276 43 389 60
Silver valuables 54 12 123 23 50 29 33 33 2 20 2 25 106 17 158 24
Buildings 56 12 41 8 118 69 58 57 4 40 0 0 178 28 99 15
Land 75 16 68 13 102 60 52 51 6 60 0 0 183 29 120 18
Both buildings & land 37 8 25 5 94 55 42 42 4 40 0 0 135 21 67 10
Clothing 405 88 486 90 158 93 83 82 9 90 8 100 572 89 577 88
Ornaments & jewellery 21 5 247 45 43 25 38 38 1 10 3 38 65 10 288 44
Weapons 326 71 9 2 126 74 28 28 7 70 0 0 459 72 37 6
Books 265 58 201 37 113 66 55 54 5 50 1 13 383 60 257 39
Music 10 2 2 0 5 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 15 2 4 1
Bedding 111 24 507 93 161 95 97 96 7 70 7 88 279 44 611 94
Household linen 173 38 524 97 160 94 97 96 7 70 8 100 340 53 629 96
Household vessels (Geschirr ) 217 47 505 93 162 95 96 95 7 70 8 100 386 60 609 93
Furniture 204 44 486 90 162 95 97 96 7 70 7 88 373 58 590 90
Household goods (Hausrat ) 275 60 435 80 163 96 92 91 7 70 4 50 445 70 531 81
Tools (farm & craft) 326 71 52 10 152 89 55 54 8 80 2 25 486 76 109 17
Animals 51 11 113 21 86 51 47 47 5 50 0 0 142 22 160 25
Food & grain stores 48 10 78 14 89 52 54 53 5 50 1 13 142 22 133 20
Wares (from workshop) 2 0 1 0 9 5 6 6 0 0 0 0 11 2 7 1
Miscellaneous 11 2 9 2 3 2 4 4 0 0 1 13 14 2 14 2
Total inventoried 460 100 543 100 170 100 101 100 10 100 8 100 640 100 652 100
Sources: HStAS, A573, Bü. 4798-4802, 4804, 4806-4808, 4814 (Abschriften); Bü. 4870-4871, 4874, 4876-4892, 4895-4897, 4901-4947 (Originale) (1602-1700).
Notes: Includes all marriage inventories (Beibringungsinventare ) in which bride (n=652) or groom (n=640) is recorded separately.
Table 3:
Individuals at Death, Ownership of Various Asset Categories, Wildberg, 1602-1700
Type of Item Unmarried Widowed Unknown Total
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Financial liabilities (Passiva ) 2 100 4 100 43 91 75 84 2 100 0 0 47 92 79 85
Financial assets (Aktiva ) 2 100 3 75 38 81 71 80 2 100 0 0 42 82 74 80
Both Passiva  & Aktiva 2 100 3 75 35 74 60 67 2 100 0 0 39 76 63 68
Cash 1 50 0 0 8 17 21 24 0 0 0 0 9 18 21 23
Silver valuables 0 0 1 25 6 13 15 17 0 0 0 0 6 12 16 17
Buildings 2 100 3 75 33 70 56 63 1 50 0 0 36 71 59 63
Land 1 50 1 25 32 68 59 66 1 50 0 0 34 67 60 65
Both buildings & land 1 50 1 25 24 51 45 51 1 50 0 0 26 51 46 49
Clothing 2 100 4 100 39 83 79 89 2 100 0 0 43 84 83 89
Ornaments & jewellery 0 0 1 25 4 9 17 19 0 0 0 0 4 8 18 19
Weapons 1 50 0 0 23 49 24 27 2 100 0 0 26 51 24 26
Books 0 0 0 0 26 55 45 51 0 0 0 0 26 51 45 48
Music 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 2
Bedding 2 100 3 75 45 96 86 97 2 100 0 0 49 96 89 96
Household linen 2 100 4 100 45 96 85 96 2 100 0 0 49 96 89 96
Household vessels (Geschirr ) 2 100 4 100 46 98 87 98 2 100 0 0 50 98 91 98
Furniture 1 50 4 100 45 96 88 99 2 100 0 0 48 94 92 99
Household goods (Hausrat ) 2 100 4 100 44 94 81 91 2 100 0 0 48 94 85 91
Tools (farm & craft) 2 100 1 25 39 83 52 58 2 100 0 0 43 84 53 57
Animals 0 0 0 0 11 23 31 35 1 50 0 0 12 24 31 33
Food & grain stores 1 50 0 0 16 34 38 43 1 50 0 0 18 35 38 41
Wares (from workshop) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
Total inventoried 2 100 4 100 47 100 89 100 2 100 0 0 51 100 93 100
Sources: As for Table 2.
Notes: Includes all death inventories recording possessions of an individual rather than a couple.
Table 4:
Couples at Marriage and Death, Ownership of Various Asset Categories, Wildberg, 1602-1700
Type of Item Marriage Death All
no. % no. % no. %
Financial liabilities (Passiva ) 293 46 286 94 579 62
Financial assets (Aktiva ) 314 50 236 78 550 59
Both Passiva  & Aktiva 203 32 226 74 429 46
Cash 484 76 114 38 598 64
Silver valuables 208 33 124 41 332 35
Buildings 248 39 264 87 512 55
Land 255 40 229 75 484 52
Both buildings & land 189 30 216 71 405 43
Clothing 584 92 261 86 845 90
Ornaments & jewellery 314 50 74 24 388 41
Weapons 468 74 144 47 612 65
Books 435 69 122 40 557 59
Music 19 3 4 1 23 2
Bedding 614 97 303 100 917 98
Household linen 625 99 303 100 928 99
Household vessels (Geschirr ) 617 97 303 100 920 98
Furniture 608 96 304 100 912 97
Household goods (Hausrat ) 585 92 302 99 887 95
Tools (farm & craft) 508 80 250 82 758 81
Animals 239 38 187 62 426 45
Food & grain stores 218 34 201 66 419 45
Wares (from workshop) 16 3 25 8 41 4
Miscellaneous 25 4 7 2 32 3
Total 634 100 304 100 938 100
Sources: As for Table 2.
Notes:
Marriage inventories = all Beibringungsinventare  in which spouses are not listed separately (n=2)
plus all which incorporate both a groom list and a bride list (n=632)
Death inventories = all contingent inheritance inventories (Eventualteilungen ) (n=283) plus those 
actual inheritance inventories (Realteilungen ) in which the two spouses died at the same time (n=21).
Table 5:
Indebtedness by Economic Stratum, Marriage and Death Inventories with Complete Values, Wildberg, 1602-1700
Zero assets 1-49 fl 50-99 fl 100-199 fl 200-499 fl 500-999 fl Over 1000 fl Total
no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Individuals
Zero debts 5 83.3 300 88.2 256 89.5 179 75.8 93 45.1 11 14.7 5 15.2 849 71.8
Debts 0.1-9.9% of wealth 0 0.0 11 3.2 15 5.2 20 8.5 39 18.9 31 41.3 13 39.4 129 10.9
Debts 10-19.9% of wealth 0 0.0 7 2.1 9 3.1 16 6.8 19 9.2 12 16.0 6 18.2 69 5.8
Debts 20-29.9% of wealth 0 0.0 5 1.5 2 0.7 8 3.4 19 9.2 10 13.3 4 12.1 48 4.1
Debts 30-39.9% of wealth 0 0.0 5 1.5 3 1.0 5 2.1 13 6.3 3 4.0 2 6.1 31 2.6
Debts 40-49.9% of wealth 0 0.0 2 0.6 1 0.3 2 0.8 9 4.4 2 2.7 1 3.0 17 1.4
Debts 50-59.9% of wealth 0 0.0 1 0.3 0 0.0 3 1.3 7 3.4 3 4.0 1 3.0 15 1.3
Debts 60-100% of wealth 0 0.0 2 0.6 0 0.0 3 1.3 7 3.4 2 2.7 1 3.0 15 1.3
Debts >100% of wealth 0 0.0 7 2.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.3 0 0.0 8 0.7
Positive debts, zero wealth 1 16.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1
Total individuals 6 100.0 340 100.0 286 100.0 236 100.0 206 100.0 75 100.0 33 100.0 1182 100.0
Couples
Zero debts 0 0.0 20 57.1 70 78.7 104 67.1 73 39.0 16 15.0 3 4.6 286 44.8
Debts 0.1-9.9% of wealth 0 0.0 5 14.3 5 5.6 20 12.9 44 23.5 41 38.3 27 41.5 142 22.3
Debts 10-19.9% of wealth 0 0.0 3 8.6 4 4.5 13 8.4 23 12.3 20 18.7 14 21.5 77 12.1
Debts 20-29.9% of wealth 0 0.0 1 2.9 4 4.5 7 4.5 14 7.5 14 13.1 9 13.8 49 7.7
Debts 30-39.9% of wealth 0 0.0 2 5.7 3 3.4 3 1.9 16 8.6 5 4.7 8 12.3 37 5.8
Debts 40-49.9% of wealth 0 0.0 1 2.9 1 1.1 2 1.3 8 4.3 6 5.6 1 1.5 19 3.0
Debts 50-59.9% of wealth 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 1.6 0 0.0 2 3.1 5 0.8
Debts 60-100% of wealth 0 0.0 2 5.7 2 2.2 5 3.2 5 2.7 5 4.7 1 1.5 20 3.1
Debts >100% of wealth 0 0.0 1 2.9 0 0.0 1 0.6 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.5
Positive debts, zero wealth 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total couples 0 0.0 35 100.0 89 100.0 155 100.0 187 100.0 107 100.0 65 100.0 638 100.0
Sources: As for Table 2.
Notes:
Economic stratum is measured in inflation-adjusted Gulden (fl); index year is 1565.
Includes only those inventories for which monetary values are recorded for all items.
Columns do not always add up to 100% because of rounding.
Table 6:
Value of Debts as Proportion of Real Estate and Moveables,
Marriage and Death Inventories with Complete Values, Wildberg, 1602-1700
Individuals Couples
no. % no. %
Real estate:
Zero debts, zero real estate 756 64.0 229 35.9
Zero debts, positive real estate 93 7.9 57 8.9
Debts = 1-59% of real estate 178 15.1 217 34.0
Debts = 60-100% of real estate 38 3.2 44 6.9
Debts > 100% of real estate 16 1.4 21 3.3
Positive debts, zero real estate 101 8.5 70 11.0
Moveables (including financial assets):
Zero debts, zero moveables 5 0.4 0 0.0
Zero debts, positive moveables 844 71.4 286 44.8
Debts = 1-59% of moveables 230 19.5 250 39.2
Debts = 60-100% of moveables 37 3.1 56 8.8
Debts > 100% of moveables 65 5.5 46 7.2
Positive debts, zero moveables 1 0.1 0 0.0
Total inventories 1182 100.0 638 100.0
Sources: 
As for Table 2.
Notes:
As for Table 5.
Table 7:
Number of Marriage and Death Inventories for Individuals and Couples, Wildberg 1602-1700
Inventory type no.
Marriage inventories: total documents 662
Marriage inventories: with any individualized list 660
Marriage inventories: with combined couple-list 2
Marriage inventories: with individual bride-list 652
Marriage inventories: with individual groom-list 640
Marriage inventories: with both bride-list and groom-list 632
Marriage inventories: total individual lists 1292
Marriage inventories: total couple lists 634
Death inventories: total documents 448
Death inventories for individuals: females plus males 144
Death inventories for individuals: females 93
Death inventories for individuals: males 51
Death inventories: couples 304
Sources: 
As for Table 2.
Notes:
Of the 660 marriage inventories with individualized lists, 28 record only one spouse: 
in 8 cases it is groom only, in 20 cases bride only.
Table 8:
Number of Inventories According to Recording of Values, Wildberg, 1602-1700
Values missing for Individual inventories Couple inventories
Marriage Death Total Marriage Death Total
no. % no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
0% of items 1098 85.0 84 58.3 1182 82.3 477 75.2 161 53.0 638 68.0
<1% of items 1141 88.3 103 71.5 1244 86.6 536 84.5 197 64.8 733 78.1
<5% of items 1219 94.3 116 80.6 1335 93.0 594 93.7 239 78.6 833 88.8
0% of total value 1100 85.1 84 58.3 1184 82.5 479 75.6 164 53.9 643 68.6
<1% of total value 1169 90.5 105 72.9 1274 88.7 551 86.9 207 68.1 758 80.8
<5% of total value 1190 92.1 113 78.5 1303 90.7 562 88.6 223 73.4 785 83.7
Total inventories 1292 100.0 144 100.0 1436 100.0 634 100.0 304 100.0 938 100.0
Sources: 
As for Table 2.
Note:
Percentages for "total value" are calculated using the estimated value of items for which no value is recorded, based on mean value of that item in other inventories.
Table 9:
Age Distribution of Inventoried Individuals, Wildberg, 1602-1700
Age Marriage Inventories Death Inventories All Inventories
m f total m f total m f total
17 1 5 6 0 0 0 1 5 6
18 4 12 16 0 0 0 4 12 16
19 4 22 26 0 0 0 4 22 26
20 24 24 48 0 0 0 24 24 48
21 27 32 59 0 0 0 27 32 59
22 22 37 59 0 0 0 22 37 59
23 47 38 85 0 1 1 47 39 86
24 36 33 69 0 0 0 36 33 69
25 37 29 66 1 0 1 38 29 67
26 33 27 60 0 0 0 33 27 60
27 32 24 56 0 0 0 32 24 56
28 22 22 44 1 0 1 23 22 45
29 24 14 38 0 0 0 24 14 38
30 24 14 38 0 0 0 24 14 38
31 16 14 30 0 0 0 16 14 30
32 9 7 16 0 0 0 9 7 16
33 15 11 26 0 0 0 15 11 26
34 14 11 25 0 1 1 14 12 26
35 4 3 7 0 0 0 4 3 7
36 9 7 16 0 0 0 9 7 16
37 3 7 10 0 0 0 3 7 10
38 5 4 9 0 1 1 5 5 10
39 3 5 8 1 0 1 4 5 9
40 5 5 10 0 0 0 5 5 10
41 3 4 7 0 0 0 3 4 7
42 4 6 10 0 0 0 4 6 10
43 2 4 6 0 0 0 2 4 6
44 3 1 4 0 0 0 3 1 4
45 3 3 6 1 0 1 4 3 7
46 0 4 4 0 1 1 0 5 5
47 1 7 8 0 1 1 1 8 9
48 2 3 5 0 1 1 2 4 6
49 2 4 6 0 1 1 2 5 7
50 2 4 6 3 4 7 5 8 13
51 2 0 2 0 1 1 2 1 3
52 4 0 4 1 0 1 5 0 5
53 5 0 5 1 1 2 6 1 7
54 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 4
55 2 0 2 0 1 1 2 1 3
56 1 3 4 0 2 2 1 5 6
57 3 2 5 2 1 3 5 3 8
58 2 1 3 1 2 3 3 3 6
59 7 0 7 1 1 2 8 1 9
60 2 1 3 1 4 5 3 5 8
61 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2
63 2 1 3 1 5 6 3 6 9
64 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 2
65 4 0 4 1 1 2 5 1 6
66 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 1 3
67 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 5 5
68 1 0 1 0 4 4 1 4 5
69 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 4
70 3 0 3 0 5 5 3 5 8
71 1 0 1 4 3 7 5 3 8
72 0 1 1 1 2 3 1 3 4
73 1 0 1 1 6 7 2 6 8
74 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 3
75 0 0 0 3 3 6 3 3 6
76 1 0 1 2 1 3 3 1 4
77 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
78 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 1 3
79 0 0 0 3 1 4 3 1 4
80 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
81 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
82 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 1 3
83 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 1 3
87 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
unknown age 150 195 345 8 23 31 158 218 376
total 640 652 1292 51 93 144 691 745 1436
% unknown 23.4 29.9 26.7 15.7 24.7 21.5 22.9 29.3 26.2
Table 10: Tobit Model of Value of Individuals' Borrowing, Wildberg 1602-1700
Variable Tobit coefficient Marginal effect
Period 1602-1633 -3.646*** -0.591***
(1.210) (0.193)
Period 1634-1648 3.408* 0.553*
(2.042) (0.330)
Period 1649-1686 -0.308 -0.0500
(0.585) (0.0947)
Period 1687-1700 3.095* 0.502*
(1.666) (0.267)
Female single -30.44 -4.982
(19.98) (3.298)
Male widowed 96.16*** 22.52***
(18.88) (5.578)
Female widowed 100.661*** 28.007***
 (20.630) (8.079)
Husband migrated -11.70 -1.898
(10.99) (1.764)
Wife migrated 7.541 1.223
(8.889) (1.433)
Death inventory 69.59** 17.02*
(27.47) (8.794)
No. live children -8.027 -1.302
(6.189) (1.005)
No. non-child heirs -0.554 -0.0899
(3.553) (0.577)
Known proto-industrial occupation -15.25* -2.459*
(9.182) (1.484)
Unknown if proto-industrial occupation 16.78 2.981
(15.53) (2.977)
Buildings in marriage inventory for unmarried 0.943*** 0.153***
(0.136) (0.0213)
Buildings in death inventory for unmarried 0.583*** 0.095***
(0.152) (0.024)
Buildings in marriage inventory for widowed 0.369*** 0.600***
(0.074) (0.012)
Buildings in death inventory for widowed 0.009 0.001
(0.108) (0.018)
Land -0.0109 -0.00177
(0.0702) (0.0114)
Furniture for unmarried -4.303 -0.698
(3.162) (0.493)
Furniture for widowed 7.423*** 1.902***
(1.957) (0.566)
Cash -0.149 -0.0241
(0.120) (0.0191)
Silver for males 11.58*** 1.879***
(4.166) (0.696)
Silver for females -10.73 -1.740
(8.649) (1.402)
Financial assets for unmarried 0.241*** 0.0391***
(0.0689) (0.0111)
Financial assets for widowed 0.036 0.006
(0.0463) (0.007)
Personal items for males 0.287 0.0465
(0.482) (0.0784)
Personal items for females -0.766* -0.124*
(0.417) (0.011)
Non-durable hh goods for unmarried 0.855*** 0.139***
(0.314) (0.0485)
Non-durable hh goods for widowed -0.151 -0.163***
(0.188) (0.0502)
Notes:
N=1182. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effect is effect on mean value of dependent variable,
assessed at sample mean of all other variables, conditional on dependent variable being positive or zero.
*** significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.10 level.
Occupations: omitted category is "Known non-proto-industrial occupation".
Table 11: Tobit Model of Value of Couples' Borrowing, Wildberg 1602-1700
Variable Tobit coefficient (standard error) Marginal effect
Period 1602-1633 -3.073*** -1.526***
(1.015) (0.502)
Period 1634-1648 -1.964 -0.975
(1.860) (0.920)
Period 1649-1686 0.891 0.442
(0.618) (0.306)
Period 1687-1700 4.481** 2.225**
(1.937) (0.951)
Husband migrated -20.88 -10.37
(13.86) (6.836)
Wife migrated 10.81 5.366
(11.06) (5.481)
Death inventory 120.4*** 71.66***
(19.84) (12.89)
No. live children -0.199 -0.0989
(5.812) (2.886)
No. non-child heirs 0.928 0.461
(4.333) (2.150)
Proto-industrial -40.57*** -19.79***
(11.26) (5.300)
Unknown if proto-industrial -7.023 -3.426
(17.48) (8.395)
Buildings in marriage inventory 0.602*** 0.299***
(0.118) (0.0550)
Buildings in death inventory 0.081 0.040
(0.068) (0.034)
Land in marriage inventory -0.132 -0.0655
(0.142) (0.0698)
Land in death inventory 0.347*** 0.172***
(0.115) (0.057)
Cattle in marriage inventory -0.867 -0.431
(0.564) (0.281)
Cattle in death inventory -2.832*** -1.406***
(0.765) (0.380)
Furniture 2.731** 1.356*
(1.369) (0.693)
Cash -0.220** -0.109**
(0.0868) (0.0425)
Silver in marriage inventory 16.64*** 8.260***
(3.895) (1.998)
Silver in death inventory 4.598* 2.238*
(2.722) (1.353)
Financial assets in marriage inventory 0.373** 0.185**
(0.162) (0.0781)
Financial assets in death inventory 0.039 0.019
(0.030) (0.015)
Work-related tools & wares 1.440*** 0.715***
(0.347) (0.169)
Notes:
N=638. Otherwise as for Table 10.
Table 12:
Number of Debts by Primary Purpose, Wildberg 1602-1700
1602-1633 1634-1648 1649-1686 1687-1700 1602-1700
no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Specific purpose
Consumption
Grain 34 4.6 14 4.3 78 5.2 38 6.6 164 5.2
Comestibles 118 15.9 32 9.9 132 8.8 51 8.8 333 10.6
Clothing & shoes 22 3.0 12 3.7 16 1.1 3 0.5 53 1.7
Wedding expenses 5 0.7 0 0.0 2 0.1 2 0.3 9 0.3
Medical expenses 12 1.6 7 2.2 45 3.0 18 3.1 82 2.6
Funeral expenses 2 0.3 7 2.2 36 2.4 51 8.8 96 3.1
Maintenance expenses 5 0.7 3 0.9 13 0.9 8 1.4 29 0.9
Misc 8 1.1 3 0.9 15 1.0 4 0.7 30 1.0
Consumption total 206 27.8 78 24.1 337 22.4 175 30.2 796 25.3
Production
Land 31 4.2 11 3.4 40 2.7 9 1.6 91 2.9
Cloth 48 6.5 10 3.1 39 2.6 2 0.3 99 3.1
Textile intermediate 5 0.7 0 0.0 19 1.3 10 1.7 34 1.1
Worsted-trading company 0 0.0 0 0.0 24 1.6 8 1.4 32 1.0
Leather industry 24 3.2 2 0.6 27 1.8 24 4.1 77 2.4
Tools 13 1.8 2 0.6 7 0.5 9 1.6 31 1.0
Wages 79 10.6 45 13.9 221 14.7 58 10.0 403 12.8
Raw materials 76 10.2 13 4.0 115 7.7 39 6.7 243 7.7
Misc 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 0.4 1 0.2 7 0.2
Production total 276 37.2 83 25.7 498 33.2 160 27.6 1017 32.3
Mixed
Buildings 81 10.9 43 13.3 146 9.7 53 9.1 323 10.3
Mixed real estate 3 0.4 1 0.3 2 0.1 4 0.7 10 0.3
Animals 23 3.1 11 3.4 45 3.0 7 1.2 86 2.7
Wares 13 1.8 1 0.3 69 4.6 14 2.4 97 3.1
Taxes 59 8.0 59 18.3 268 17.8 134 23.1 520 16.5
Fines 1 0.1 1 0.3 10 0.7 1 0.2 13 0.4
Inheritance-related 21 2.8 21 6.5 54 3.6 18 3.1 114 3.6
Charitable donation 1 0.1 5 1.5 6 0.4 0 0.0 12 0.4
Inventorying & writing costs 50 6.7 14 4.3 55 3.7 11 1.9 130 4.1
Misc 8 1.1 6 1.9 12 0.8 3 0.5 29 0.9
Mixed total 260 35.0 162 50.2 667 44.4 245 42.2 1334 42.4
Specific purpose total 742 100.0 323 100.0 1502 100.0 580 100.0 3147 100.0
General purpose
Capital sum 199 56.1 103 53.9 286 45.7 165 46.1 753 49.2
Capital sum plus interest 3 0.8 1 0.5 6 1.0 0 0.0 10 0.7
Debts, no further description 17 4.8 2 1.0 26 4.2 1 0.3 46 3.0
Financial instruments 3 0.8 2 1.0 8 1.3 2 0.6 15 1.0
Installments 4 1.1 4 2.1 21 3.4 9 2.5 38 2.5
Moneys 25 7.0 13 6.8 37 5.9 7 2.0 82 5.4
Minor day-to-day debts 10 2.8 2 1.0 16 2.6 2 0.6 30 2.0
Zins on capital 5 1.4 1 0.5 19 3.0 4 1.1 29 1.9
Zins, no further description 89 25.1 63 33.0 207 33.1 168 46.9 527 34.4
General purpose total 355 100.0 191 100.0 626 100.0 358 100.0 1530 100.0
No purpose given
Private persons 691 87.1 215 83.3 1413 81.1 564 79.5 2883 82.3
Officials 33 4.2 11 4.3 107 6.1 66 9.3 217 6.2
Institutions 33 4.2 11 4.3 132 7.6 40 5.6 216 6.2
Other 36 4.5 21 8.1 91 5.2 39 5.5 187 5.3
No purpose given total 793 100.0 258 100.0 1743 100.0 709 100.0 3503 100.0
Specific purpose given 742 39.3 323 41.8 1502 38.8 580 35.2 3147 38.5
General purpose given 355 18.8 191 24.7 626 16.2 358 21.7 1530 18.7
No purpose given 793 42.0 258 33.4 1743 45.0 709 43.0 3503 42.8
All debts 1890 100.0 772 100.0 3871 100.0 1647 100.0 8180 100.0
Sources: As for Table 2.
Notes:
Includes only those debts for which values were recorded (n=8,180).
Columns do not always add up to 100% because of rounding.
Table 13:
Value of Debts by Primary Purpose, Wildberg 1602-1700
1602-1633 1634-1648 1649-1686 1687-1700 1602-1700
value % value % value % value % value %
Specific purpose
Consumption
Grain 69.1 2.0 26.4 2.0 198.1 3.6 47.5 3.5 341.0 3.0
Comestibles 165.4 4.9 95.3 7.3 207.4 3.8 89.6 6.6 557.7 4.9
Clothing & shoes 42.1 1.2 1.9 0.1 6.6 0.1 7.1 0.5 57.8 0.5
Wedding expenses 7.3 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 8.4 0.1
Medical expenses 7.5 0.2 3.3 0.3 15.7 0.3 3.3 0.2 29.8 0.3
Funeral expenses 2.5 0.1 3.5 0.3 25.9 0.5 61.6 4.5 93.4 0.8
Maintenance expenses 2.0 0.1 2.5 0.2 34.6 0.6 7.8 0.6 46.8 0.4
Misc 4.7 0.1 11.9 0.9 19.6 0.4 7.9 0.6 44.1 0.4
Consumption total 300.5 8.9 144.9 11.1 508.8 9.4 224.9 16.5 1179.1 10.3
Production
Land 304.0 9.0 46.2 3.5 377.6 6.9 35.7 2.6 763.6 6.6
Cloth 154.7 4.6 12.4 1.0 73.5 1.4 0.2 0.0 240.9 2.1
Textile intermediate 28.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 17.6 0.3 12.8 0.9 58.7 0.5
Worsted-trading company 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.4 0.8 3.9 0.3 46.3 0.4
Leather industry 81.1 2.4 1.6 0.1 19.3 0.4 12.5 0.9 114.5 1.0
Tools 14.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 92.3 6.8 107.5 0.9
Wages 84.7 2.5 30.0 2.3 235.9 4.3 14.2 1.0 364.8 3.2
Raw materials 228.4 6.8 57.1 4.4 588.7 10.8 107.7 7.9 982.0 8.5
Misc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.1
Production total 895.4 26.5 147.5 11.3 1363.8 25.1 279.4 20.4 2686.1 23.4
Mixed
Buildings 1742.1 51.6 629.4 48.1 2274.9 41.8 578.3 42.3 5224.7 45.5
Mixed real estate 21.1 0.6 3.5 0.3 23.5 0.4 49.2 3.6 97.3 0.8
Animals 45.8 1.4 14.3 1.1 148.8 2.7 34.6 2.5 243.4 2.1
Wares 56.1 1.7 10.6 0.8 141.9 2.6 16.7 1.2 225.3 2.0
Taxes 66.7 2.0 61.4 4.7 357.8 6.6 140.5 10.3 626.4 5.5
Fines 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 15.6 0.3 1.1 0.1 17.3 0.2
Inheritance-related 171.0 5.1 212.2 16.2 525.7 9.7 24.9 1.8 933.8 8.1
Charitable donation 17.6 0.5 31.7 2.4 11.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 60.5 0.5
Inventorying & writing costs 35.2 1.0 21.8 1.7 19.2 0.4 3.6 0.3 79.7 0.7
Misc 23.9 0.7 29.9 2.3 47.0 0.9 13.4 1.0 114.3 1.0
Mixed total 2179.8 64.6 1015.0 77.6 3565.6 65.6 862.3 63.1 7622.7 66.4
Specific purpose total 3375.7 100.0 1307.4 100.0 5438.2 100.0 1366.6 100.0 11487.9 100.0
General purpose
Capital sum 1446.8 57.7 773.1 73.9 1645.5 64.3 965.2 77.7 4830.7 65.7
Capital sum plus interest 52.1 2.1 17.6 1.7 61.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 131.5 1.8
Debts, no further description 85.7 3.4 28.2 2.7 443.4 17.3 0.0 0.0 557.3 7.6
Financial instruments 24.6 1.0 3.0 0.3 19.5 0.8 0.2 0.0 47.3 0.6
Installments 23.5 0.9 40.5 3.9 92.2 3.6 110.3 8.9 266.6 3.6
Moneys 786.2 31.3 43.2 4.1 85.7 3.3 8.9 0.7 923.9 12.6
Minor day-to-day debts 8.9 0.4 3.5 0.3 27.0 1.1 0.5 0.0 40.0 0.5
Zins on capital 4.4 0.2 0.8 0.1 19.0 0.7 5.0 0.4 29.2 0.4
Zins, no further description 76.6 3.1 135.7 13.0 166.1 6.5 151.5 12.2 530.0 7.2
General purpose total 2508.8 100.0 1045.6 100.0 2560.2 100.0 1241.7 100.0 7356.4 100.0
No purpose given
Private persons 1228.7 69.2 440.0 61.5 1578.4 66.5 814.9 82.1 4062.1 69.4
Officials 69.1 3.9 36.8 5.1 209.7 8.8 54.5 5.5 370.1 6.3
Institutions 133.7 7.5 52.4 7.3 423.4 17.8 59.9 6.0 669.5 11.4
Other 343.4 19.3 186.7 26.1 161.3 6.8 63.1 6.4 754.5 12.9
No purpose given total 1774.9 100.0 716.0 100.0 2372.9 100.0 992.4 100.0 5856.2 100.0
Specific purpose given 3375.7 44.1 1307.4 42.6 5438.2 52.4 1366.6 38.0 11487.9 46.5
General purpose given 2508.8 32.8 1045.6 34.1 2560.2 24.7 1241.7 34.5 7356.4 29.8
No purpose given 1774.9 23.2 716.0 23.3 2372.9 22.9 992.4 27.6 5856.2 23.7
All debts 7659.4 100.0 3069.0 100.0 10371.3 100.0 3600.7 100.0 24700.4 100.0
Sources: As for Table 2.
Notes: As for Table 12.
Table 14:
Number of Debts by Documentation, Wildberg 1602-1700
Documentation 1602-1633 1634-1648 1649-1686 1687-1700 1602-1700
no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Accounts
Public 4 8.9 3 14.3 26 22.2 5 19.2 38 18.2
Private 19 42.2 9 42.9 18 15.4 6 23.1 52 24.9
Unknown 1 2.2 0 0.0 2 1.7 2 7.7 5 2.4
Accounts Total 24 53.3 12 57.1 46 39.3 13 50.0 95 45.5
Registers & books
Public 1 2.2 2 9.5 32 27.4 10 38.5 45 21.5
Private 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 3.4 0 0.0 4 1.9
Unknown 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 3.4 0 0.0 4 1.9
Registers & Books Total 1 2.2 2 9.5 40 34.2 10 38.5 53 25.4
Inheritance-related
Will 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.7 0 0.0 2 1.0
Inventory 4 8.9 0 0.0 2 1.7 0 0.0 6 2.9
Division 1 2.2 4 19.0 4 3.4 0 0.0 9 4.3
Guardian 2 4.4 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 3 1.4
Specification 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 0.5
Inheritance Total 7 15.6 4 19.0 10 8.5 0 0.0 21 10.0
Legal court 4 8.9 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 5 2.4
Misc. Public
Public: Auszug 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.7 0 0.0 2 1.0
Public: Brief 3 6.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 1.4
Public: Specification 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.7 1 3.8 3 1.4
Public: Verzeichnis 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.7 0 0.0 2 1.0
Misc. Public Total 3 6.7 0 0.0 6 5.1 1 3.8 10 4.8
Misc. Private
Private: Auszug 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 0.5
Private: Bekenntnis 0 0.0 1 4.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.5
Private: Brief 3 6.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 1.4
Private: Handschrift 1 2.2 1 4.8 1 0.9 0 0.0 3 1.4
Private: Kontrakt 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 7.7 2 1.0
Private: Obligation 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.7 0 0.0 2 1.0
Private: Schreiben 1 2.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.5
Private: Urkunde 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 0.5
Private: Zettel 1 2.2 0 0.0 5 4.3 0 0.0 6 2.9
Misc. Private Total 6 13.3 2 9.5 10 8.5 2 7.7 20 9.6
Misc. Unknown
Unknown: Auszug 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 0.5
Unknown: Caution 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 1.7 0 0.0 2 1.0
Unknown: Schreiber 0 0.0 1 4.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.5
Unknown: Urkunde 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 0.5
Misc. Unknown Total 0 0.0 1 4.8 4 3.4 0 0.0 5 2.4
Total with documentation 45 100.0 21 100.0 117 100.0 26 100.0 209 100.0
No documentation recorded 1845 97.6 751 97.3 3754 97.0 1621 98.4 7971 97.4
Grand Total 1890 772 3871 1647 8180
Sources:
As for Table 2.
Notes:
As for Table 12.
Table 15:
Value of Debts by Documentation, Wildberg 1602-1700
Documentation 1602-1633 1634-1648 1649-1686 1687-1700 1602-1700
value % value % value % value % value %
Accounts
Public 8.2 3.0 27.2 20.6 151.8 27.4 2.0 1.0 189.2 16.4
Private 97.0 35.6 45.7 34.6 80.1 14.4 90.6 45.8 313.4 27.1
Unknown 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 11.5 2.1 2.6 1.3 14.5 1.2
Accounts Total 105.5 38.7 73.0 55.2 243.5 43.9 95.3 48.1 517.1 44.7
Registers & books
Public 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.5 36.4 6.6 25.0 12.6 62.2 5.4
Private 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Unknown 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Registers & Books Total 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.5 37.2 6.7 25.0 12.6 63.1 5.4
Inheritance-related
Will 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.3
Inventory 46.6 17.1 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 49.8 4.3
Division 0.7 0.3 43.3 32.8 6.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 50.8 4.4
Guardian 11.7 4.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 14.2 1.2
Specification 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.1
Inheritance Total 59.0 21.6 43.3 32.8 17.7 3.2 0.0 0.0 119.9 10.4
Legal court 7.4 2.7 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 10.9 0.9
Misc. Public
Public: Auszug 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.4 2.6 0.0 0.0 14.4 1.2
Public: Brief 52.4 19.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.4 4.5
Public: Specification 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 84.9 15.3 0.2 0.1 85.1 7.4
Public: Verzeichnis 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.2
Misc. Public Total 52.4 19.3 0.0 0.0 101.7 18.3 0.2 0.1 154.3 13.3
Misc. Private
Private: Auszug 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1
Private: Bekenntnis 0.0 0.0 5.5 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 0.5
Private: Brief 40.5 14.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.5 3.5
Private: Handschrift 2.8 1.0 2.6 2.0 4.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 9.8 0.9
Private: Kontrakt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 77.4 39.1 77.4 6.7
Private: Obligation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 35.0 3.0
Private: Schreiben 3.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 0.3
Private: Urkunde 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.3
Private: Zettel 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 96.1 17.3 0.0 0.0 97.2 8.4
Misc. Private Total 47.9 17.6 8.1 6.1 140.5 25.3 77.4 39.1 273.9 23.7
Misc. Unknown
Unknown: Auszug 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Unknown: Caution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 1.9 0.0 0.0 10.6 0.9
Unknown: Schreiber 0.0 0.0 7.1 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.6
Unknown: Urkunde 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Misc. Unknown Total 0.0 0.0 7.1 5.3 10.9 2.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 1.6
Total with documentation 272.4 100.0 132.1 100.0 554.9 100.0 197.9 100.0 1157.3 100.0
No documentation recorded 7387.0 96.4 2937.0 95.7 9816.4 94.6 3402.7 94.5 23543.1 95.3
Grand Total 7659.4 3069.0 10371.3 3600.7 24700.4
Sources:
As for Table 2.
Notes:
As for Table 12.
Table 16:
Number of Debts by Relationship between Debtors and Creditors, Wildberg 1602-1700
Creditor relationship 1602-1633 1634-1648 1649-1686 1687-1700 1602-1700
no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Persons
Kin 119 6.3 50 6.5 240 6.2 110 6.7 519 6.3
Servants and masters 12 0.6 28 3.6 79 2.0 10 0.6 129 1.6
Guardians and wards 7 0.4 2 0.3 6 0.2 1 0.1 16 0.2
No relationship given 1512 80.0 562 72.8 2679 69.2 1118 67.9 5871 71.8
Total persons 1650 87.3 642 83.2 3004 77.6 1239 75.2 6535 79.9
Non-persons
Officials 88 4.7 25 3.2 259 6.7 128 7.8 500 6.1
Institutions 146 7.7 94 12.2 553 14.3 265 16.1 1058 12.9
Groups 6 0.3 11 1.4 55 1.4 15 0.9 87 1.1
Total non-persons 240 12.7 130 16.8 867 22.4 408 24.8 1645 20.1
Total debts 1890 100.0 772 100.0 3871 100.0 1647 100.0 8180 100.0
Sources:
As for Table 2.
Notes:
As for Table 12.
Table 17:
Value of Debts by Relationship between Debtors and Creditors, Wildberg 1602-1700
Creditor relationship 1602-1633 1634-1648 1649-1686 1687-1700 1602-1700
value % value % value % value % value %
Persons
Kin 2143.9 28.0 270.0 8.8 1534.9 14.8 443.2 12.3 4392.0 17.8
Servants and masters 7.1 0.1 23.9 0.8 88.3 0.9 10.2 0.3 129.5 0.5
Guardians and wards 31.3 0.4 17.6 0.6 10.5 0.1 0.9 0.0 60.2 0.2
No relationship given 4698.3 61.3 2316.9 75.5 6366.5 61.4 2093.4 58.1 15475.0 62.7
Total persons 6880.5 89.8 2628.4 85.6 8000.2 77.1 2547.6 70.8 20056.8 81.2
Non-persons
Officials 137.5 1.8 55.0 1.8 406.9 3.9 108.9 3.0 708.3 2.9
Institutions 618.4 8.1 273.9 8.9 1829.1 17.6 930.7 25.8 3652.2 14.8
Groups 22.9 0.3 111.7 3.6 135.1 1.3 13.5 0.4 283.2 1.1
Total non-persons 778.9 10.2 440.6 14.4 2371.1 22.9 1053.1 29.2 4643.7 18.8
Total debts 7659.4 100.0 3069.0 100.0 10371.3 100.0 3600.7 100.0 24700.4 100.0
Sources:
As for Table 2.
Notes:
As for Table 12.
Table 18:
Number of Debts by Locality of Creditors, Wildberg 1602-1700
Locality of 1602-1633 1634-1648 1649-1686 1687-1700 1602-1700
creditor no. % no. % no. % no. % no. %
Definitely Wildberg 324 17.1 115 14.9 702 18.1 394 23.9 1535 18.8
Definitely non-Wildberg 447 23.7 157 20.3 924 23.9 308 18.7 1836 22.4
Place not given 1119 59.2 500 64.8 2245 58.0 945 57.4 4809 58.8
Total 1890 100.0 772 100.0 3871 100.0 1647 100.0 8180 100.0
Sources:
As for Table 2.
Notes:
As for Table 12.
Table 19:
Value of Debts by Locality of Creditors, Wildberg 1602-1700
Locality of 1602-1633 1634-1648 1649-1686 1687-1700 1602-1700
creditor value % value % value % value % value %
Definitely Wildberg 1,156.0 15.1 412.3 13.4 1,847.0 17.8 985.3 27.4 4,400.6 17.8
Definitely non-Wildberg 2,070.1 27.0 1,067.2 34.8 2,974.0 28.7 755.6 21.0 6,866.9 27.8
Place not given 4,433.3 57.9 1,589.6 51.8 5,550.3 53.5 1,859.8 51.7 13,432.9 54.4
Total 7,659.4 100.0 3,069.0 100.0 10,371.3 100.0 3,600.7 100.0 24,700.4 100.0
Sources:
As for Table 2.
Notes:
As for Table 12.
